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ABSTRACT
This Note identifies a discrepancy in the law governing the
decisionmaking that directs patient care. Seeking treatment that a third
party will pay for, a patient needs not only a physician-prescribed
course of treatment but also an insurer’s verification that the cost is
medically necessary or otherwise covered by the patient’s plan. Both
of these decisions directly impact the ultimate care delivered to the
patient, but are governed by two very different liability regimes. A
patient who suffers an adverse outcome may sue his physician in tort,
while a patient who suffers from a lack of coverage may generally sue
his insurer only under contract. In other words, when a patient suffers
from inadequate care, his potential remedies vary considerably
depending on whether the physician or the insurer is the defendant.
This discrepancy in liability is the consequence of the federal law
governing the administration of employer-sponsored health plans,
and its extensive preemption of related state law. Many commentators
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have called for legal reform to address the distortion of managed care
liability that results, arguing that managed care liability must be
consistent or that wronged beneficiaries must have access to
meaningful remedies. This Note argues that the federal law governing
managed care organizations is problematic for a different reason and
that the first step toward reform may be more elementary than
previously suggested. Specifically, it suggests that the law governing
insurers’ coverage decisions is inconsistent with the law governing
treatment recommendations. Patients suffer the same harm from error
in both contexts—but because they can recover substantially more
from treating physicians, doctors are named as defendants even when
the insurers make errors. Further, this Note argues that simply
aligning these two standards might offer a gateway to reform.

INTRODUCTION
Health-care costs ultimately arise from the accumulation of
individual decisions doctors make about which services and
treatments to write an order for. The most expensive piece of
medical equipment, as the saying goes, is a doctor’s pen.
1

—Atul Gawande

If the most expensive piece of medical equipment is the doctor’s
pen, then it is the stroke of this pen that is driving the American
health care system into the ground. Collectively, the nation spends
over two trillion dollars every year to provide mediocre medical care
2
to only a segment of the population. Individually, Americans pay
3
premiums that are increasing four times faster than inflation. These
ghastly fees go straight to third-party payers, most of whom “manage”
care in an attempt to rein in the doctor’s pen and contain costs that
4
are now unsustainable. Predictably, one of the most effective ways to
curb medical costs is to disagree with the doctor and simply refuse to
cover the treatment his pen prescribes.
1. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town Can Teach Us About Health
Care, NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 40.
2. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA OF
RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 25 (2009) (noting that annual health care
spending amounts to almost eight thousand dollars per person).
3. Kevin Sack, Necessary Medicine?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, § 4 (Week in Review), at
1.
4. Managed care is a unique type of insurance administration designed to reduce health
care spending. See infra Part I.
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When an insurer and a doctor disagree, the former usually wins:
most people have health insurance precisely because they cannot
afford the treatments they will need when they fall ill. Yet when a
patient forgoes a denied treatment and later discovers that his doctor
was right, he—or his estate—will likely seek a remedy for the harm he
has suffered from this lack of care. Ironically, it is his doctor, and not
his insurer, who most often pays the price.
This legal anomaly has been the subject of much debate;
managed care organizations serve to contain costs by allocating
treatments, but generally escape liability even when they fail to
5
exercise due care in determining the medical necessity of one. The
6
Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)
preempts any state-imposed liability for employer-sponsored health
plans relating to the administration of health benefits, but does not
7
impose parallel federal liability in its place. As a result, most patients
receive health care benefits from plans that are not subject to
common or state law standards of care, and that offer no replacement
recovery scheme for wronged beneficiaries. Managed care liability
reform has been the outcry—to no avail—of many health law scholars
who bemoan both the inconsistent legal regime that extensive state
8
law preemption creates as well as the dearth of remedies it leaves to
9
wronged plaintiffs.

5. Extensive federal preemption applies to most managed care organizations, exempting
them from liability under state laws. See infra Part II.
6. The Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–461
(2006).
7. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); see also infra Part II.
8. See, e.g., Gail B. Agrawal & Mark H. Hall, What If You Could Sue Your HMO?
Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 235, 238 n.14 (2003)
(“Within this patchwork system, it is nearly impossible to answer legal questions concerning
managed care liability with any level of generality, other than ‘it depends.’” (quoting Peter J.
Hammer, Pegram v. Herdrich: On Peritonitis, Preemption, and the Elusive Goal of Managed
Care Accountability, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 767, 768 n.2 (2001))); Linda P. McKenzie,
Eligibility, Treatment, or Something In-Between? Plaintiffs Get Creative to Get Past ERISA
Preemption, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 272, 295–300 (2007) (discussing the pleading
strategies used to avoid ERISA preemption).
9. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix
It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 535 (2003) (arguing that a
reinterpretation of ERISA as it applies to health care would reduce the perceived need for a
patients’ bill of rights); Wendy K. Mariner, Slouching Toward Managed Care Liability:
Reflections on Doctrinal Boundaries, Paradigm Shifts, and Incremental Reform, 29 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 253, 265 (2005) (noting that ERISA’s provision allowing beneficiaries to seek injunction
to enforce benefits is inadequate because “[i]t is unrealistic to expect patients who are sick and
in need of rapid treatment to go to federal court to make sure that their health plans make
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This Note provides an additional rationale for reform, arguing
that the status quo of managed care liability is untenable because it is
inconsistent with liability governing physicians. In medicine, contract
and tort liability intersect and differently govern the conduct of two
parties providing care to one patient. This Note illustrates that the
imposition of these disparate standards of care has extremely
negative implications for health care, and is a cause of unsustainable
spending. Cost-containment efforts have failed and will continue to
fail so long as this gap persists. Providers nearly always serve as the
“deep pocket” for patients, even when it is the insurer who wrongly
10
denied coverage. Consequently, physicians fear malpractice liability
whenever an insurer exercises a cost-containment policy, and may
refuse either to treat a patient or to alter a patient’s records to
guarantee coverage. Only by eliminating the inconsistencies that the
liability gap presents can health care costs be controlled in any
meaningful way.
Managed care plays a critical role in health care costcontainment goals, and one that will grow as health care reform looks
toward insurers to increasingly reduce spending. In the next year,
managed care will undergo an unprecedented expansion: the
uninsured 15 percent of the nation will carry coverage for the first
11
time in history. This tremendous opportunity for enrollment growth
stems from a legislative assumption that managed care organizations
12
are the appropriate vehicles for curbing costs, as well as an
increasing reliance on these entities to fulfill this role as access to care
13
expands. For better or for worse, managed care is and will continue
to be the conduit for containing costs.
timely, accurate decisions”); Shauhin A. Talesh, Breaking the Learned Helplessness of Patients:
Why MCOs Should Be Required to Disclose Financial Incentives, 26 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 49,
75 (2002) (observing that Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), represents a judicial shift
from adopting a patient perspective to an MCO perspective).
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 2, at 25.
12. None of the legislation set forth in the health care debate has proposed a novel method
for containing costs. See generally HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH
REFORM: SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF MAJOR HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSALS 19
(Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/healthreform_sbs_full.pdf (comparing
the various congressional health reform measures on a continually updated basis).
13. Senator Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, refused to grant
advocates of a single-payer system a seat at health care reform meetings and ordered thirteen
physicians and nurses to be removed when they arrived regardless. Victoria Colliver, Local
Supporters of Single-Payer System Head to Capitol Hill, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 2009, at A8.
House Representative Anthony Weiner proposed a single payer amendment, H..R. 676, to the
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Yet despite its central role in accomplishing health care reform,
managed care liability is strikingly absent from legislative discourse.
In the entire health care debate, only one proposal has even
14
mentioned managed care liability—and only tangentially so.
Without addressing the present liability landscape governing
managed care organizations, the current reform movement will rely
heavily on managed care’s cost-containment strategies without
implementing an effective safeguard against overaggressive and
medically inappropriate tactics.
The success of health care reform is far beyond the scope of this
Note, which addresses only the movement’s extensive reliance on
managed care as the vehicle for curbing rising costs. Absent express
legislative attention to the disconnect between the liability standards
attaching to coverage and treatment decisions, this unprecedented
dependence on the industry will create rippling negative effects on
15
the quality of health care.
This Note is divided into four parts. Part I reviews the role that
managed care organizations play in making coverage decisions, and
the extent to which these decisions overlap with treatment decisions
traditionally left to the physician. Part I also briefly examines the
legislative proposals for health care reform, and—finding that none of
these proposals advocate changing the way third-party payers
participate in the system—concludes that managed care’s role in
health care will not change. Part II sets forth the current liability
scheme governing managed care organizations’ coverage decisions. It
House health care reform bill. Press Release, Physicians for a Nat’l Health Program, House
Vote on Single Payer Will Be Historic First, Doctor’s Group Says (Aug. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.pnhp.org/news/2009/august/house_vote_on_single.php.
Representative
Weiner
withdrew this amendment before the bill went to a vote, stating that it would distract from
attempts to create a public option. Press Release, Rep. Weiner Withdraws Single Payer
Amendment from Current Health Care Debate (Nov. 6, 2009), available at
http://weiner.house.gov/news_display.aspx?id=1368.
14. The House Tri-Committee America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 (H.R.
3200) proposes that Congress adopt standards for financial and administrative transactions to
which managed care organizations would be held, including standard electronic transactions and
timely and transparent claims and denial management processes. America’s Affordable Health
Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 164(a)(1) (as reported by H. Tri-Comm., Oct. 14,
2009) (“The Secretary shall adopt and regularly update standards . . . . [that will] require timely
and transparent claim and denial management processes, including tracking, adjudication, and
appeal processing.”); see also HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 12, at 19
(comparing the various congressional health reform measures on a continually updated basis).
15. The different standards of care that attach to a physician’s choice of treatment versus
an insurer’s decision to cover that treatment create a cascade of problems in health care
delivery. See infra Parts II.B, III.A–B.
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illustrates that, because of ERISA’s preemptive effect, the majority
of these entities escape any meaningful liability for failure to exercise
due care in denying treatment coverage. Part III then contrasts this
liability with the traditional tort regime governing physician behavior,
arguing that two regimes governing utilization review and treating
physicians create incompatible standards for care that is administered
to the same patient. Finally, Part IV argues that these conflicting
standards are antithetical to the goal of managed care: providing lowcost and high-quality health care.
I. MANAGED CARE: THE DE FACTO VEHICLE FOR COST
CONTAINMENT
Managed care emerged as a method to control costs of the feefor-service reimbursement system supported by insurance plans.
Under a fee-for-service model, an insurer reimburses a health care
17
provider for services rendered. The physician alone determines the
18
“volume and kinds of services” he provides. Under a managed care
model, however, an insurer reviews the care the physician provides—
either prospectively or retrospectively—and reserves the right to
approve or deny requests for coverage. The physician cannot provide
and bill for endless services, thereby subjecting the patient to
19
unnecessary care for his own financial gain. However, in their quest
to eliminate coverage of superfluous care, insurers may also deny
payments for medically necessary care, thereby precluding physicians
from providing appropriate treatments. Therefore, the degree to
which managed care and physician decisions conflict is important to
understand.
Managed care replaced indemnity insurance in an effort to
reduce the high costs realized under a traditional fee-for-service

16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–461 (2006); see also infra Part II.
17. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000) (“Traditionally, medical care in the
United States has been provided on a ‘fee-for-service’ basis. A physician charges so much for a
general physical exam, a vaccination, a tonsillectomy, and so on. The physician bills the patient
for services provided or, if there is insurance and the doctor is willing, submits the bill for the
patient’s care to the insurer . . . .”).
18. Arnold S. Relman, Perspective, Doctors as the Key to Health Care Reform, 361 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1225, 1225 (2009).
19. Cf. id. (noting that the fee-for-service payment structure creates a “strong financial
incentive for [physicians] to maximize the elective services they provide”).
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20

reimbursement schedule. Replacing a payment schedule that
21
rewarded quantity over quality, managed care ideally controls
spending by “managing” a patient’s treatment regime and thereby
ensuring that the patient does not receive duplicative or unnecessary
22
diagnostics or procedures. This process is called utilization review—
insurers review the care a physician recommends, and determine
23
whether it is within the patient’s plan. This determination often
hinges on whether the care is medically necessary.
Managed care coverage decisions conflict with physician
decisions whenever an insurer denies coverage for a treatment the
physician prescribes. The decision made in utilization review—
whether a treatment is medically necessary—has traditionally been a
24
decision reserved exclusively for the treating physician. Therefore,
when an insurer denies coverage of a treatment plan, managed care
effectively trumps the physician’s treatment decisions and directly
interferes with patient care.
At face value, obstruction of patient care appears inflammatory,
but utilization review is not necessarily antithetical to quality care.
When cost containment is a priority, managed care organizations are
more effective than physicians at performing the utilization review

20. Patricia M. Danzon & Mark V. Pauly, Health Insurance and the Growth in
Pharmaceutical Expenditures, 45 J.L. & ECON. 587, 593 (2002) (“In the 1980s and 1990s
managed care insurance in its various forms . . . largely replaced traditional indemnity insurance
for general health insurance.”).
21. See, e.g., Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218 (“In a fee-for-service system, a physician’s financial
incentive is to provide more care, not less, so long as payment is forthcoming. The check on this
incentive is a physician’s obligation to exercise reasonable medical skill and judgment in the
patient’s interest.”).
22. See Danzon & Pauly, supra note 20, at 594 (noting that managed care organizations
were able to expand depth of coverage by implementing highly effective “cost control
strategies”).
23. See, e.g., Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 2 n.1 (1st Cir. 1999)
(“Utilization review refers to an external evaluation of the appropriateness of a given course of
treatment based upon established clinical criteria.” (quoting Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 50 n.9 (D. Mass. 1997))); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 352
n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (“HMOs often contain costs through a strategy known as ‘utilization review.’
Unlike traditional insurance policies, HMOs usually decide whether to reimburse patients for
medical care prospectively—through utilization or ‘pre-certification’ review. The HMO may
either perform the utilization review itself or assign the task to a third-party contractor.”
(citations omitted)).
24. Barak Richman, On Doctors and Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1731, 1735 (2009) (noting that
the “chore of making medical decisions and carefully allocating healthcare resources for all of
society” has traditionally been a role of physicians).
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25

role. This becomes apparent as soon as one considers the divergent
26
costs of medicine in different regions of the nation. Spending levels
are correlated neither with quality of care nor with medical
experience, but rather differ based on the practice routines of a given
27
region’s physicians. For example, the average annual cost of care
provided to Medicare patients—which is one of the best
approximations of total health care spending—ranged from just over
six thousand dollars to over fifteen thousand dollars in different
28
regions, but quality of care did not differ between those regions.
Physicians in high-cost regions provide up to 60 percent more care—
more tests, procedures, specialist consultations, and hospital
admissions—than physicians in low-cost regions, but do not produce
29
healthier patients in doing so. In fact, President Obama’s budget
director estimates that the government could reduce Medicare
spending by nearly 30 percent if spending in high-cost regions was
30
reduced to the levels in lower-cost areas. The Supreme Court also
has recognized the need for constraining costs, and views this as a
31
function of managed care.
In addition to constraining costs, managed care organizations
could (but currently do not) serve as umbrellas in integrated systems
32
of care. Integrated systems of care reduce costs and improve quality
in two ways. First, by fostering collaboration and cooperation
between health care providers in all specialties and at all levels of

25. See Ellen Wertheimer, Calling It a Leg Doesn’t Make It a Leg: Doctors, Lawyers, and
Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 154, 168 (2008) (noting that courts have treated
cost-containment policies as “a necessary check on doctors’ perceived tendency to recommend
unnecessary and excessive treatment”).
26. Gawande, supra note 1 passim.
27. Id. at 40–41.
28. Id. at 36.
29. Id. at 38.
30. Id. at 39 (citing Peter Orszag, Budget Director for President Obama).
31. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 234 (2000) (“HMOs came into being because
some groups of physicians consistently provided more aggressive treatment than others in
similar circumstances, with results not perceived as justified by the marginal expense and risk
associated with intervention.”).
32. For example, in Massachusetts, a state commission on health care payment issues has
recommended the state manage its growing health care costs and improve quality of delivery by
creating “‘accountable care organizations’ (ACOs), which would organize physicians into
multispecialty teams with strong primary care staffing.” Relman, supra note 18, at 1226; see also
Robert Steinbrook, Perspective, The End of Fee-for-Service Medicine? Proposals for Payment
Reform in Massachusetts, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1036, 1036–38 (2009) (describing the
commission’s proposal for payment reform in more detail).
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training, integrated systems eliminate piecemeal physician
decisionmaking, and thereby reduce repetition and error in patient
33
care. Second, by redistributing liability such that the third-party
payers bear risk for adverse outcomes, payers assume accountability
34
for the administration of all care delivered to its beneficiaries.
Delivery systems such as the Mayo Clinic and Kaiser Permanente
have successfully coordinated patient care, but are outliers in a
35
system dominated by disaggregated practice groups or individuals.
Furthermore, these integrated group practices do not rely on private
insurers to make coverage decisions, and some argue that they could
36
not do so without sacrificing quality of care. Others assert that
managed care can properly organize provider delivery if subject to
37
enterprise liability.
38
Building systems of integrated care may be the ultimate goal,
but containing costs while expanding coverage is the only priority
receiving legislative attention at the moment. Instead, health care
39
reform legislation is focused both on expanding coverage and
33. See Francis J. Crosson, Perspective, 21st-Century Health Care—The Case for Integrated
Delivery Systems, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1324, 1325 (2009) (referring to studies “show[ing] that
integrated care is positively correlated with improved quality”); Relman, supra note 18, at 1226
(proposing a health care delivery system based on multispecialty group practices).
34. Many argue that risk sharing between providers and payers would incentivize providers
to exercise optimal care and payers to establish quality oversight. See Jennifer Arlen & W.
Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1993–95 (2003) (arguing that entity level liability on the part of the
managed care organization results in optimal levels of care by all parties); Crosson, supra note
33, at 1325 (“Kaiser Permanente’s history shows that risk sharing between the payer and the
care delivery system can work quite well.”).
35. Crosson, supra note 33, at 1324; see also Relman, supra note 18, at 1226 (citing
integrated systems such as the Mayo Clinic and Kaiser Permanente as models for reform).
36. See Relman, supra note 18, at 1227 (arguing that private insurers’ role in a system of
integrated care should be limited to making capitated prepayments to the physician groups,
“leav[ing] medical care decisions where they belong—in the hands of physicians and patients”).
37. Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 34, at 1993–95; see also Alice A. Noble & Troyen A.
Brennan, Managing Care in the New Era of “Systems-Think”: The Implications for Managed
Care Organizational Liability and Patient Safety, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 290, 300 (2001)
(suggesting that the threat of liability may encourage MCOs to improve quality).
38. The Chairman of the Council of Accountable Physician Practices argues that “rapid
transition for established integrated delivery systems and gradual transition for the majority of
physicians and hospitals” is necessary to improve quality of care while constraining spending.
He notes that while this change may be spurred with “early forms of payment reform,” it is
impossible to predict how long it would take to complete. Crosson, supra note 33, at 1324–25.
39. The Obama administration has made clear that increased access to care is a primary
goal. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 2, at 26 (“[M]oving to provide all Americans
with health insurance is not only a moral imperative, but it is also essential to a more effective
and efficient health care system.”).

RECORD IN BINDER EDIT

964

1/15/2010 2:07:37 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:955

40

reducing unsustainable costs. These goals require extremely
effective cost-containment strategies that physicians alone cannot
41
offer. Without drastic reductions in health care spending, an
unprecedented number of Americans will face bankruptcy merely by
42
seeking necessary treatment. Thus, President Obama has called on
Congress to reform health care “so that patients get the best care, not
43
just the most expensive care.” To this end, Congress seems to be
44
relying on both reduced federal fee-for-service payments and on
managed care organizations’ ability to contain costs, and has rejected
45
proposals that would alter this structure of compensation for care.
Furthermore, neither the House nor the Senate has considered
altering managed care’s role in performing utilization review. For
example, although numerous proposals focus on “reducing waste and
inefficiency” and eliminating “unnecessary” or “repetitive”
treatments and procedures, none sets forth the means to achieve
46
these goals. Therefore, managed care will increasingly serve to
control health care spending.
Discord between managed care and physician treatment
decisions is problematic when it involves disagreement over the rigor
or quality of treatment a patient will receive. Whereas a physician’s
treatment recommendation must meet a reasonable standard of care,
a managed care organization’s refusal to cover that treatment need

40. The administration has promised to “reduce high administrative costs, unnecessary
tests and services, waste, and other inefficiencies that consume money with no added benefit.”
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 12, at 19.
41. See Crosson, supra note 33, at 1324 (arguing that health care reform in Massachusetts is
evidence that “near-universal coverage can be attained” but will only be “financially
sustainable” if the unnecessary care resulting from fee-for-service payment of physicians is
eliminated).
42. Between 2001 and 2007, the proportion of bankruptcies due to medical debt increased
by 50 percent. David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007:
Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 744 (2009).
43. Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President on Health Care and the Senate
Vote on F-22 Funding (July 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-the-President-on-Health-Care-and-the-Senate-Vote-on-F-22-Funding/.
44. Reducing Medicare reimbursement rates is one way legislators propose to reduce
federal costs. Denis A. Cortese & Jeffrey O. Korsmo, Perspective, Putting U.S. Health Care on
the Right Track, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1326, 1327 (2009).
45. The most obvious alternative to managed care—a single-payer system—was quickly
eliminated from consideration in the health care debate. See supra note 13.
46. See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 12, at 19–23 (summarizing
proposals for cost containment).
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47

not. Because managed care organizations aspire to decrease
48
expenditures, they deny coverage whenever possible and escape
49
liability even when a denial is negligent. Moreover, because few
patients can afford treatments their insurers refuse to cover, a
managed care organization nearly always trumps a physician in
defining medically necessary care. Thus, physicians occasionally are
prohibited from providing care that is consistent with their
professional and legal obligations. Part II describes the standard of
care that managed care organizations must meet, and the liability
vacuum many of them enjoy. Part III then illustrates the discrepancy
between the standard of care governing the treatment decisions made
in utilization review, and those made by the practicing physician.
II. THE EXISTING LIABILITY REGIME GOVERNING MANAGED
CARE’S ADMINISTRATION OF UTILIZATION REVIEW POLICIES
Most managed care organizations operate in a legal vacuum. The
preemptive force of ERISA shields an employer-sponsored health
plan from state and common law theories of liability, including
medical malpractice, even when it makes medical treatment decisions
through utilization review. ERISA allows plan beneficiaries to
challenge coverage decisions for breach of contract, but not for
50
negligence. Essentially, these plans make determinations about the
medical necessity of a given treatment, but are not held to the
51
professional standards of care a patient expects of his doctor. They
can be liable for nothing more than the cost of benefits denied, even
52
when a coverage decision resulted in irreversible injury or death.

47. Under ERISA, any employer-sponsored health plan is exempted from state law
standards of care relating to the administration of benefits. See infra Part II.
48. Cf. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 250 (“Inevitably . . . managed care practices or
incentives will cause or contribute to harm in some individual cases.”); Charity Scott, Why Law
Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 245, 289 n.136 (2000) (“[I]n their zeal to control utilization, managed care plans may
withhold appropriate diagnostic procedures or treatment modalities for patients.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Ethical Issues in Managed
Care, 273 JAMA 330, 330–35 (1995))).
49. See infra Part II.
50. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
51. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring), quoted by Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
52. Id.
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This Part illustrates why most managed care organizations face
little liability for their medical treatment decisions. Section A
discusses the broad preemptive effects of ERISA. Section B then
demonstrates preemption’s practical effects on potential plaintiffs by
highlighting the state law remedies that it forecloses.
A. ERISA’s “[E]xtraordinary [P]re-emptive [P]ower”

53

Federal law usually preempts state and common law theories of
liability applied to managed care organizations. The majority of
54
individuals receive health insurance through their employers, which
places most managed care under the purview of ERISA. ERISA
governs all pension plans offered by employers (with exception for
55
some government employers and church plans). Enacted to protect
employee interests in pension and benefit plans from both plan
56
default and plan mismanagement, ERISA provides employee
57
plaintiffs with a federal cause of action and several federal remedies.
At the same time, it preempts nearly all related state causes of
58
action. ERISA preemption is extremely broad; only one other

53. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65
(1987)).
54. Nearly two-thirds of the population under sixty-five (the age at which Medicare
benefits accrue) receive employer-sponsored health insurance. Mark W. Stanton, EmployerSponsored Health Insurance: Trends in Cost and Access, RESEARCH IN ACTION, Sept. 2004,
at 1, 1, http://www.ahrq.gov/research/empspria/empspria.pdf; see also TOM DASCHLE, SCOTT S.
GREENBERGER & JEANNE M. LAMBREW, CRITICAL: WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THE
HEALTH-CARE CRISIS 188 (2008) (noting that employers provide health care insurance for 60
percent of Americans, though this number is falling quickly as health care premiums rise).
55. BARRY D. ALEXANDER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH LAW 267 (4th ed. 2008).
56. E.g., McKenzie, supra note 8, at 275.
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131–35 (2006); see also McKenzie, supra note 8, at 279 (“[T]he Supreme
Court has . . . construed [ERISA] section 502(a) to have extremely broad preemptive
power. . . . [T]he Court has held that state contract, tort and statutory claims that could have
been brought . . . are preempted . . . . A second and distinct type of preemption emanating from
502(a) is termed ‘complete preemption.’ . . . Complete preemption serves to re-characterize a
state law claim into one arising under federal law. As such, the claim is removable by a
defendant to federal court.” (footnotes omitted)).
58. Designed to provide uniformity in the administration of employee benefit plans,
ERISA’s conflict and complete preemption clauses preempt any cause of action arising under a
state law relating to an employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (interpreting Congress’s rejection of a limited preemption
clause as evidence of intent to create sweeping preemption of state laws); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105 (1983) (“By establishing benefit plan regulation ‘as exclusively a
federal concern,’ Congress minimized the need for interstate employers to administer their
plans differently in each State in which they have employees.” (footnote omitted) (quoting
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981))); McKenzie, supra note 8, at 278–
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federal law, the Labor Management Relations Act, has similar
59
preemptive power.
ERISA preemption is problematic in the context of managed
care. Congress enacted ERISA before employee benefit plans
encompassed health insurance, and before managed care dominated
60
health care administration. Thus, it fashioned civil remedies to allow
beneficiaries to recover from the wrongful administration of ordinary
pension, but not health care, benefits. In other words, ERISA allows
beneficiaries to recover the cost of benefits denied but precludes
recovery of compensatory or punitive damages. When a beneficiary is
denied coverage of medically necessary care, however, he suffers not
only economic loss, but also adverse health consequences (including
death). Thus, recovery of the benefits denied is severely inadequate in
the context of wrongful administration of health care benefits.
Moreover, because ERISA remedies are exclusive, a wronged
beneficiary may not turn to state law to recover for the harm that
ERISA ignores.
79, 282–83 (providing an in-depth discussion of ERISA’s preemption and savings clauses).
ERISA, however, does not preempt claims that are exempted from preemption by a savings
clause. See Charlotte Johnson, Comment, Justice Ginsburg’s Fiduciary Loophole: A Viable
Achilles’ Heel to HMOs’ Impenetrable ERISA Shield, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1589, 1590 (“ERISA
itself contains a safe harbor called the Savings Clause, which allows state law claims to avoid
ERISA preemption if the claims relate to the ‘business of insurance.’ However, the Supreme
Court has narrowly interpreted the Savings Clause to only allow exemption from preemption if
the state law claimed does not . . . conflict with what is covered by ERISA’s remedial scheme as
contained in § 502.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 114(b)(2)(A))); see also McKenzie,
supra note 8, at 278–79, 282–83 (providing an in-depth discussion of ERISA’s preemption and
savings clauses).
59. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004)) (“[ERISA’s] pre-emptive
force mirror[s] the pre-emptive force of LMRA . . . . [T]he ERISA civil enforcement mechanism
is one of those provisions with such ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ that it ‘converts an
ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the wellpleaded complaint rule.’” (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987))).
60. Johnson, supra note 58, at 1590. Courts disagree as to whether Congress foresaw that
ERISA would preempt causes of action arising from the negligent implementation of costcontainment policies. Compare Pappas v. Asbel (Pappas), 675 A.2d 711, 716 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996) (reasoning that Congress did not intend to preempt recovery for negligent
implementation of cost-containment policies because these policies were nonexistent at the
time), with Pappas v. Asbel (Pappas I), 724 A.2d 889, 894 n.6 (Pa. 1998) (pointing to the
enactment of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 as evidence that Congress
understood the extent and implications of cost-containment activities when it drafted ERISA).
Whether Congress foresaw cost containment as an element of health care administration is a
rather academic point; regardless of congressional intent, ERISA preemption has resulted in a
completely inconsistent recovery system for the negligent administration of cost-containment
policies, and thus creates an inadequate legal landscape for the governing of managed care
activity.
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The Supreme Court is not blind to ERISA’s shortcomings in the
context of health care administration. It has tried to account for the
unique nature of the administration of health care benefits in its
preemption reasoning. Specifically, the Court has distinguished
between coverage decisions hinging on eligibility and those hinging
61
62
on treatment, reasoning that only the former fall under ERISA. In
other words, the Court has acknowledged that when plans make
treatment decisions, they affect patient care rather than the
administration of benefits, and thus implicate state medical
malpractice law. The Court’s reading of ERISA preemption,
however, is so broad that it has refused to allow wronged
beneficiaries to use state law to challenge a coverage decision that
involved both medical judgment and plan administration, so long as
the medical judgment was made by a utilization review physician who
63
never saw the patient. As a result, patients denied coverage of
medically necessary care suffer real health consequences but are
precluded from recovering anything more than the cost of benefits
denied.
Pure eligibility decisions emulate traditional plan administration
tasks, hinging on “[r]ules governing collection of premiums, definition
of benefits, submission of claims, and resolution of disagreements
64
over entitlement to services.” In other words, an eligibility decision

61. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228 (2000).
62. See, e.g., id. at 229–31 (refusing to allow a claim filed under ERISA to allege breach of
fiduciary duty where the contested action involved an element of a treatment decision, rather
than a pure eligibility decision).
63. See, e.g., Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding
that the plaintiffs’ state tort claims against the defendant insurance company for negligent
supervision and training of personnel and negligent infliction of emotional distress were
preempted by ERISA because they “create[d] a threat of conflicting and inconsistent state and
local regulation of the administration of ERISA plans”); Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d
937, 941–42 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiffs’ state law claims against the defendant
insurance company for wrongful death, improper refusal to authorize benefits, medical
malpractice, and insurance bad faith were preempted by ERISA because they related to the
insurance plan); Corcoran v. United HealthCare Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that, because the defendant insurance company had made “medical decisions incident
to benefit determinations,” the plaintiffs’ state tort action for wrongful death of their child was
preempted by ERISA (emphasis added)); Elsesser v. Phila. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 802 F.
Supp. 1286, 1290–91 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that the plaintiffs’ state tort negligence claims,
founded on the defendant insurance company’s refusal “to pay for the [requested medical
device],” were preempted by ERISA when the plaintiffs sought to hold the company “directly
liable” for negligence, explaining that “such a claim . . . clearly has a [connection to] a benefit
plan” (second alteration in original)).
64. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 223.
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involves nothing more than a determination as to whether a given
65
treatment is covered under the terms of a beneficiary’s plan. These
66
decisions are squarely governed by ERISA. Thus, ERISA would
preempt a beneficiary from using state law to challenge denied
coverage of a given drug treatment based on the terms of a plan
because the claim would contest what was “promised under the terms
67
of [an] ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan[].”
Treatment decisions, on the other hand, involve medical
judgments. Because managed care organizations perform utilization
review, some benefits decisions go far beyond the scope of traditional
plan administration. For example, a blanket provision in a policy that
required all newborns to be discharged within twenty-four hours of
birth was not governed by ERISA (and could be challenged under
68
state law) because it directly implicated medical care. When
eligibility for coverage hinges on a treatment being medically
necessary, a plan administrator must make a “mixed” coverage
decision—interpreting both the terms of a beneficiary’s plan and the
69
medical needs of the patient. To the extent that a health plan covers
medically necessary treatment, a coverage denial will hinge on an
insurer’s determination that physician-recommended care is not
implicated, and will result in the insurer overriding the treating
physician’s course of treatment—substituting a lower-cost option or
denying coverage completely. Inappropriate coverage denial can have
the same practical effect as a physician’s failure to exercise reasonable
care, and can cause far greater harm than ordinary misappropriation
70
71
of plan benefits. Thus, in Pegram v. Herdrich, the Supreme Court
65. Id. at 228.
66. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987) (reasoning that a state or
common law cause of action “based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits
under an employee benefit plan, undoubtedly meet[s] the criteria for pre-emption” (emphasis
added)).
67. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 211 (2004).
68. In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 162–64 (3d Cir. 1999). But see Corcoran, 965
F.2d at 1322–24, 1333 n.16 (concluding that ERISA preempted a medical malpractice claim
against an insurer for refusal to cover hospitalization for fetal monitoring—resulting in
stillbirth—because the decision was related to a “cost-containment feature of the plan” and thus
“implicated the management of plan assets”).
69. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228 (reasoning that pure “eligibility decisions” turn on a plan’s
coverage of particular conditions or medical procedures, whereas “‘[t]reatment decisions,’ by
contrast, are choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient’s condition: given
a patient’s constellation of symptoms, what is the appropriate medical response”).
70. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat’l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993) (discussing
how the defendant insurance company refused to cover the plaintiff’s heart surgery until it was
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concluded that ERISA does not govern treatment decisions that
ultimately affect quality of care (rather than mere quantity of
72
benefits). In Pegram, a patient suffered a ruptured appendix after
her physician ordered her to wait eight days for an ultrasound at a
clinic affiliated with the insurer, rather than get immediate care at a
local hospital. The treating physician happened to own the HMO
73
governing the patient’s benefits. The Court concluded that ERISA
could not bar the beneficiary from bringing state law malpractice and
fraud actions against the insurer-physician because the provision of
74
medical care is not within ERISA’s scope.
Since concluding that treatment decisions are beyond ERISA’s
75
scope, however, the Court has construed the class of coverage
76
determinations that implicate these decisions extremely narrowly. In
other words, the universe of mixed decisions that survive preemption
77
is quite small —ERISA governs any utilization review decision unless
78
the patient’s treating physician is directly involved. Courts reason
that a claim dispute implicating a treating physician is beyond the
too late for him to undergo surgery); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Kuhl, 999 F.2d 298
(No. 93-755) (“Without threat of legal recourse, an HMO’s most cost-effective decisionmaking
process includes the provision of only suboptimal medical care to the patient/member . . . . It no
longer makes economic sense for the HMO to base its medical decisionmaking on the best
interests of patient/members. [The plaintiff] was a victim of that kind
of . . . decisionmaking . . . and he died as a result.”).
71. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
72. Id. at 232 (“[W]hen Congress took up the subject of fiduciary responsibility under
ERISA, it concentrated on fiduciaries’ financial decisions, focusing on pension plans, the
difficulty many retirees faced in getting the payments they expected, and the financial
mismanagement that had too often deprived employees of their benefits. . . . Its focus was far
from the subject of [a medical necessity determination] claim.” (citation omitted)).
73. Id. at 215.
74. See id. at 214 (holding that treatment decisions made by HMOs’ physician employees
are not fiduciary acts under ERISA).
75. Id. at 228.
76. Health law scholar Professor Korobkin asserts that the Court’s later narrowing of the
category of medical decisions that subject insurers to state law was not based on ERISA
language, and reflects a misreading of the law. See Korobkin, supra note 9, at 534–37 & n.372
(arguing that a proper interpretation of what falls within the scope of ERISA, and what does
not, would reduce the perceived need for federal legislation either amending ERISA or creating
a new federal cause of action against managed care entities).
77. Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting
that Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), significantly narrowed the class of mixed
decisions that survive preemption).
78. See Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Fla., 381 F.3d 1274, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (holding that a claim challenging denial of coverage that entails a mixed eligibility and
coverage decision is not preempted when that decision was made by either the treating
physician or his employer).
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scope of ERISA because it “does not involve a claim for benefits, a
claim to enforce rights under the benefit plan or a claim challenging
administration of the benefit plan,” and therefore does not relate to
79
the plan. In contrast, when a physician conducts utilization review on
behalf of an insurer without seeing the patient, and disagrees with the
treating physician’s recommendations, the reviewing physician’s
decision has a “connection with or a reference to a benefit plan,” and
is thus protected by complete preemption of any state law tort
80
action. Essentially, plans may be vicariously liable under state law
for the actions of treating physicians they employ, but not for the
81
actions of utilization review physicians who never see a patient.
This narrow interpretation of the extent to which coverage
determinations involve treatment decisions prevents patients from
filing malpractice actions against insurers for negligent utilization
review. For example, the Second Circuit concluded that an insurer’s
fatal delay in approving coverage of a single stem cell transplant as
medically necessary (in place of the double stem cell treatment that
the insurer already had deemed experimental) could not be
challenged under state law because the insurer was not “actually

79. Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154–55 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1994)); see also id. (“Just as
ERISA does not preempt the malpractice claim against the doctor, it should not preempt the
vicarious liability claim against the HMO if the HMO has held out the doctor as its agent.”);
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 350 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding the insurer subject to a
state malpractice action under a vicarious liability theory because the claim was unrelated to the
collection of benefits or the terms of the plan); Kohn v. Del. Valley HMO, Inc., No. 91-2745,
1991 WL 275609, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1991) (“Although an HMO is not usually liable for
the negligence of the independent contractor physicians and health care providers that service
the HMO members, an HMO may nevertheless be held liable if the health care provider is the
‘ostensible’ agent of the HMO. . . . [which requires that the plaintiff establish that] the HMO
‘act[ed] or omit[ed] (sic) to act in some way which leads the patient to a reasonable belief that
he is being treated by the [HMO] or one of its employees.’” (alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Jones v. Philpott, 702 F. Supp. 1210, 1210 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Boyd v. Albert
Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988))).
80. Elsesser v. Phila. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290–91 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(quoting Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also id.
(allowing a state law malpractice action against an HMO for its employment of a primary care
physician who failed to read the results of a heart monitor after the HMO denied coverage of
the monitor and ordered the physician to discontinue the patient’s use, but not for the insurer’s
decision to deny coverage of the monitor).
81. See Kohn, 1991 WL 275609, at *2–5 (holding that a malpractice action against an HMO
for vicarious liability for its treating physicians was not preempted, but that the claims against
the HMO for direct negligence were preempted).
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82

providing medical care” to the patient. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit
reasoned that ERISA preempted a malpractice action against an
insurer that wrongfully denied coverage of a recommended heart
surgery (only to grant coverage once the patient’s heart had
deteriorated to a fatal degree) because the utilization review of the
cardiologist’s recommendations could not be separated from the
83
administration of the beneficiary’s benefits.
This rule—that preemption arguments fail when the treating
physician contributes to the decision to deny coverage, but not when
a utilization review physician denies coverage based on medical
criteria—has proved impracticable in the lower courts. Courts
struggle to accept that a medical decision made by a utilization review
physician is not subject to tort simply because “the only relationship”
between this physician and the patient is the administration of the
84
beneficiary’s plan. This confusion has resulted in an unpredictable
85
pattern of preemption. Liability under state law may turn on “the
structure of the managed care organization . . . . which state the plan
is in . . . . [and] the prevailing judicial attitudes toward ERISA
86
87
preemption,” among other things. Plaintiff lawyers are therefore

82. Cicio v. Does, 385 F.3d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see also
Land, 381 F.3d at 1276 (reasoning that mixed decisions involving treatment and eligibility
determinations are preempted so long as the named defendants are neither the actual treating
physicians nor the physicians’ employers).
83. Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat’l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993).
84. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 200, 211 (2004) (holding that the
plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by ERISA, in part because “the only relationship [the
defendant insurance company] had with [the plaintiff] was its partial administration of [the
plaintiff’s] employer’s benefit plan”).
85. See, e.g., Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 237–39 (discussing how “[various political
and judicial events have] produced a complicated, evolving, and somewhat dichotomized
liability landscape” (footnote omitted)); Peter J. Hammer, supra note 8, at 768 n.2
(“[A]ccountability for health care providers must be cobbled together in an ad hoc fashion.
Within this patchwork system, it is nearly impossible to answer legal questions concerning
managed care liability with any level of generality, other than ‘it depends.’”).
86. Hammer, supra note 8, at 768 n.2 (noting that judicial attitudes toward preemption
“have themselves changed dramatically over just the past five years”).
87. The perceptions of attorneys working for managed care organizations reflect this
uncertainty. In a series of interviews with health plan managers and attorneys representing the
plans, Professors Agrawal and Hall found wide variability in the perceived risk of liability. See
Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 238–39 (noting that many attorneys working for local managed
care organizations—in states with and without right-to-sue statutes—described the risk of
liability as only a “theoretical concern,” whereas attorneys working for national or interstate
managed care organizations described the risk of liability as substantial and predicted that the
real impact of liability will be felt within a few years).
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hesitant even to name a managed care organization as a defendant.
Thus, ERISA has sufficiently confused the legal backdrop behind
managed care, creating a blanket of protection for insurers
89
administering employee benefit plans.
B. A Day Late and a Dollar Short
ERISA preemption precludes beneficiaries from recovering
compensatory or punitive damages for denial of treatment coverage
90
decisions that negatively affect care. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of ERISA preemption has resulted in
inconsistent theories of liability that discourage wronged beneficiaries
from filing claims against their insurers.
ERISA generally preempts state right-to-sue laws and denies
injured plaintiffs recovery of anything more than the cost of benefits
91
denied. State laws creating liability for the negligent denial of

88. See Mark A. Hall & Gail Agrawal, MarketWatch: The Impact of State Managed Care
Liability Statutes, 22 HEALTH AFF. 138, 143 (2003) (“[A]lmost all of the plaintiffs’ lawyers we
interviewed said that they are very reluctant to sue health plans unless the right set of facts
presents itself.”).
89. See, e.g., Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 250 (“[M]anaged care organizations have
enjoyed a shield from liability for challenges to cost containment initiatives, at least as to claims
by those 137 million Americans who are ERISA plan beneficiaries.” (footnote omitted)); Scott,
supra note 48, at 290 n.138 (“ERISA has evolved into a shield of immunity that protects health
insurers, utilization review providers, and other managed care entities from potential liability
for the consequences of their wrongful denial of health benefits.” (quoting Andrews-Clarke v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D. Mass. 1997))).
90. There is a strong argument that the Court has mistakenly focused on preemption,
ERISA’s secondary purpose, at the expense of benefit protection, its primary purpose. See
McKenzie, supra note 8, at 276 (“The Court’s emphasis on ERISA’s secondary purpose
[preemption] has come at the expense of the Act’s stated primary purpose. Although drafted
primarily to protect the interests of employees in their pension and benefit plans, ERISA often
erects insurmountable barriers to employees’ claims against these plans. The result is that a
beneficiary sustaining damages as a result of this health plan’s denial of a covered benefit often
has no adequate remedy under state or federal law.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Johnson,
supra note 58, at 1589–90 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has inadvertently painted itself into a
corner by restrictively interpreting ERISA to preclude compensatory relief to victims of HMO
patient treatment decisions[] . . . .”).
91. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1326 (5th Cir. 1992)
(noting that recovery under ERISA is limited to the cost of medical benefits denied);
Summers v. Touchpoint Health Plan, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 182, 195 (Wis. 2008) (holding that “the
appropriate remedy is for the beneficiary to be provided with a benefits application process that
is not arbitrary and capricious, which may or may not result in coverage for the treatments”).
The Court has consistently rejected arguments that ERISA’s grant of “equitable relief” under
section 1132 allows for a remedy that would make the plaintiff whole—a remedy that, following
the denial of health care coverage, would require recovery of much more than the monetary
value of benefits denied. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S.
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92

coverage for medically necessary care expressly allow plaintiffs to
93
sue managed care organizations, but very rarely survive preemption
94
challenges. As a result, wronged beneficiaries seeking recovery from
an employer-based insurer are left with the sparse civil remedies
95
offered by ERISA. The following three cases are illustrative of this
problem, and set the scene for understanding why patients often sue
their physicians for the harm their insurers have created.
First, in the most famous wrongful denial of coverage dispute,
the Supreme Court considered two consolidated challenges to two
96
different health plans. Uncontested in both challenges was that the
plan beneficiaries had suffered irreversible harm as a result of
wrongful denials of care coverage. One suffered internal bleeding
after his plan substituted a lower cost pain killer for his physician97
prescribed medication. He was subsequently hospitalized and

204, 209–10 (2002) (noting that equitable relief does not constitute all relief); Mertens v. Hewitt
Ass., 508 U.S. 248, 258 (1993) (“‘Equitable’ relief must mean something less than all relief.”);
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (“Congress did not provide, and did
not intend the judiciary to imply, a cause of action for extracontractual damages caused by
improper or untimely processing of benefit claims.”); see also John H. Langbein, What ERISA
Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2003) (arguing both that the Court has erred in applying an
antiquated meaning of “equitable relief” to ERISA litigation, and that this error may be
corrected in time, as suggested by the strong dissents in all three cases).
92. See, e.g., Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 271–74 (describing state laws creating
managed care liability whenever possible without running into ERISA preemption).
93. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 48, at 290 n.138 (discussing various theories of liability under
which challenges to denials of medically necessary care have been successful); see also Agrawal
& Hall, supra note 8, at 240 n.16 (noting the large awards against managed care organizations
for denial of coverage); James Bartimus & Christopher A. Wright, HMO Liability: From
Corporate Negligence Claims for Negligent Credentialing and Utilization Review to Bad Faith, 66
UMKC L. REV. 763, 772 (1998) (noting the first successful bad faith tort claim for denial of
coverage of care).
94. Cf. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 253–54 (discussing lower court cases that seem to
chip away at ERISA preemption of state laws that create managed care liability, but noting that
a few Supreme Court opinions only hint at doing so in dicta); McKenzie, supra note 8, at 272
(discussing a punitive damages award against an employer-sponsored health care plan, which
seems to contradict ERISA preemption precedent); Noble & Brennan, supra note 37, at 291
(suggesting that ERISA preemption is weakening).
95. Justice Ginsburg has described ERISA as creating a “regulatory vacuum” in which
“virtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few federal substitutes are provided.”
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting
DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
96. Id. at 204 (majority opinion).
97. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Aetna Health,
542 U.S. 200.
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98

underwent substantial treatment. The other experienced postsurgical complications and was rehospitalized after her insurer denied
coverage of the extended hospital stay recommended by her
99
physician. The issue was whether the wronged beneficiaries could
recover pain and suffering damages under a state law that required
health plans to exercise ordinary care in making health care treatment
100
decisions. The Court concluded that the state law cause of action
could not survive ERISA’s “extraordinary pre-emptive power,” even
101
though it did not facially implicate the federal law. In other words,
because the “only connection” between the beneficiaries and their
respective health plans was the administration of the plan, the
plaintiffs were doing nothing more than contesting that
102
administration, even though it involved medical decisionmaking.
Therefore, the plaintiffs were unable to recover under state tort law
and were limited to filing a federal action for breach of contract,
103
seeking nothing more than “recovery of benefits denied.”
The Fifth Circuit also concluded that ERISA preempted a
beneficiary’s claim for wrongful denial of coverage, which had been
104
filed under state insurance regulations. The plaintiff, a cancer
patient, sued the third-party administrator of her insurer’s utilization
review policy, alleging that it had issued secret coverage guidelines
instructing its employees to differentiate between medically necessary
and experimental treatments in a different manner than that set forth
105
in the plan’s policy. Reasoning that ERISA does not provide a
remedy for generating and adhering to secret coverage guidelines—
even those that materially affect decisions to deny coverage—the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment
106
for the defendant insurer, leaving the plaintiff with nothing.

98. Id.
99. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 205.
100. Id. at 204; Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA), TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 88.001–.003 (West 2004 Supp. Pamphlet).
101. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 207–09 (“[W]hen the federal statute completely pre-empts
the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even
if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law. ERISA is one of these
statutes.” (citations omitted)).
102. Id. at 214.
103. Id. at 211.
104. Hubbard v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, 42 F.3d 942, 945 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995).
105. Id. at 944–45.
106. Id. at 946.
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Finally, a court in the Northern District of Texas came to the
same conclusion when presented with a preemption challenge to
common law malpractice and negligence claims filed against an
107
insurer. The deceased beneficiary—a non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma
patient—experienced a fatal delay in beginning chemotherapy after a
108
Kaiser physician misdiagnosed her with Hepatitis C. Her estate
sued Kaiser, alleging that cost-containment policies had limited the
physician’s use of diagnostic procedures and had tortiously interfered
109
with the patient-physician relationship. The court, concluding that
“claims regarding plan guidelines and utilization review procedures”
are always preempted, denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand to
110
state court.
These cases provide a glimpse of the extent to which ERISA’s
preemptive force denies beneficiaries recourse against insurers. The
result is that beneficiaries—wrongly denied coverage of medically
necessary care—suffer the ensuing harm of forgoing treatment, and
are left with no recourse other than the recovery of benefits originally
111
denied. Several courts have recognized this inherent gap in the law
112
and have called out to Congress to address the issue. Others insist
113
that the recovery of benefits is equitable and fair, turning a blind

107. Silva v. Kaiser Permanente, 59 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
108. Id. at 598.
109. Id. at 599.
110. Id. at 599–600.
111. See Yodzis v. Tilak, 2009 WL 465448, at *13–14 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2009) (noting that
preemption of a malpractice claim against an insurer for wrongful denial of coverage unfairly
leaves the plaintiff without recovery, but that the court is helpless to rule otherwise until
Congress amends the law).
112. Justice Ginsburg, feeling compelled by ERISA’s plain language to concur in the
Court’s Aetna Health decision, announced that she did so only while joining “the rising judicial
chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled
ERISA regime.” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); see also Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting in
part) (describing ERISA’s remedial scheme as a “gaping wound” that “will not be healed until
the Supreme Court reconsiders the existence of consequential damages under the statute, or
Congress revisits the law to the same end”).
113. See, e.g., Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 211 (“Upon the denial of benefits, respondents
could have paid for the treatment themselves and then sought reimbursement through a
§ 502(a)(1)(B) action, or sought a preliminary injunction.”); Cicio v. John Does, 385 F.3d 156,
157 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (noting that the decedent “could have paid for the
treatment . . . . and then sought reimbursement . . . . or sought a preliminary injunction”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 273–74
(3d Cir. 2001) (suggesting that patients who are wrongfully denied care should seek an
injunction enforcing the administration of employee benefits under ERISA’s section 502(a)).
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eye to the immeasurable harm that the denial of coverage can cause
114
patients who cannot otherwise afford necessary treatment.
III. THE GAP BETWEEN CONTRACT AND TORT LIABILITY:
APPLYING DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF CARE TO UTILIZATION
REVIEW AND DIRECT PATIENT CARE
Extensive federal preemption shields most managed care plans
from state and common law liability even when they make coverage
decisions regarding the medical necessity of care. Thus, the liability
attaching to negligent treatment decisions made during utilization
review is substantially less than the liability that attaches to treatment
decisions made by the practicing physician. Ironically, the former’s
treatment decisions trump and sometimes even shape those of the
latter. This discrepancy in liability and authority results in two
paradoxical consequences. First, insurers exert tremendous control
over physician decisionmaking and can prospectively deny coverage
for a physician’s recommended course of treatment. Second, despite
subjection to this power, treating physicians retain ultimate
responsibility for the patient’s treatment as well as any adverse
outcomes. Moreover, because patients often cannot file state law
claims against managed care organizations, this physician is
frequently the only available defendant.
A. Managed and Well Controlled
The essence of managed care organizations is control over
physician decisionmaking. Indeed, this control is imperative to the
ultimate success of any cost-containment policy seeking to curtail
unnecessary care. The Congressional Budget Office attributes the
114. The harm caused by the denial of treatment is often fatal. See, e.g., Payton v. Aetna/US
Healthcare, No. 100440/99, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 91, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 22, 2000) (noting
that the patient, who had repeatedly appealed the denial of coverage for inpatient chemical
dependency rehabilitation, died of a drug overdose eight days before his insurer accepted the
State Insurance Department’s finding that the patient’s contract “‘plainly’ covers inpatient
substance abuse rehabilitation” and reversed its denial of coverage); Mariner, supra note 9, at
265 (“[I]t is unlikely that [seeking an injunction to enforce administration of benefits] could
speed up or improve the decisionmaking process in the majority of cases . . . . It is unrealistic to
expect patients who are sick and in need of rapid treatment to go to federal court to make sure
that their health plans make timely, accurate decisions.”); see also Hughes v. Blue Cross of N.
Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 856–57 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding ample evidence that the insurer acted
unreasonably in denying benefits); Pappas v. Asbel (Pappas I), 724 A.2d 889, 894 n.6 (Pa. 1998)
(arguing that Congress was not ignorant of cost-containment procedures utilized by HMOs
when it crafted ERISA).
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success of insurers’ cost-containment efforts to four factors, all of
which require a level of control: (1) contracting with cost-conscious
providers; (2) establishing an effective network of information about
and control over these providers; (3) placing financial risk on
providers; and (4) generating a large portion of each provider’s
115
patient load.
Managed care organizations exert this control in various ways,
many of which stem from their contractual agreements with
116
providers. By limiting coverage to a given set of physicians,
managed care organizations ensure that doctors cannot treat their
117
enrollees without being bound to their policies. Thus, managed care
organizations effectively force physicians to comply with cost118
containment practices. Capitation payments, salaries and bonuses,
fee withholding, without-cause termination, and utilization review are
119
all examples of either direct or indirect control over physicians.
Short of exclusion from a policy, these forms of control, coupled with
120
physicians’ liability risks, negatively affect morale, relationships
121
with patients, and the ability to provide quality health care.

115. Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-Care Plans
Make with Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1682–83 (1995).
116. Legislation passed in the 1980s provided managed care organizations with the right to
selectively contract with physicians. Harold S. Luft, Why Are Physicians So Upset About
Managed Care?, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 957, 958–59 (1999).
117. Restriction over patients’ choice of physicians varies by type of managed care
organization; Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) restrict patients to visiting providers
contracting with the HMO, whereas Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and Point of
Service HMO plans offer higher benefits or lower co-pays to patients who see providers
contracting with these plans. Kristin L. Jensen, Releasing Managed Care’s Chokehold on
Healthcare Providers, 16 ANN. HEALTH L. 141, 147 (2007). But see Luft, supra note 116, at 960–
62 (defining a managed care organization as one that controls the number and type of patient
services offered, and arguing that PPOs are not part of managed care but are rather a
discounted version of a fee-for-service model).
118. See Luft, supra note 116, at 959 (noting that managed care organizations use their large
member enrollment to coerce physicians into signing contracts with cost-containment policies).
119. Talesh, supra note 9, at 62; see also Richard C.W. Hall, Legal Precedents Affecting
Managed Care: The Physician’s Responsibilities to Patients, 35 PSYCHOSOMATICS 105, 105
(1994) (“[M]anaged health care inserts a layer of control between patient and physician. The
physician’s motives and duties may become confused and suspect in this new context and
relationship.”).
120. See supra Part II.C.
121. A survey by the New York Medical Society found that 90 percent of physicians change
their treatment patterns because of managed care restrictions and 92 percent believe that these
restrictions are not in patients’ best interests. HEALTH CARE FOR AM. NOW, HEALTH
INSURANCE COMPANY ABUSES: HOW THE RELENTLESS DRIVE FOR PROFIT ENDANGERS
AMERICANS 7 (2009), available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/page/-/documents%
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Some managed care contractual provisions control physician
behavior directly. For example, without-cause termination clauses
allow insurers to exclude physicians from their coverage policies for
failure to adhere to a given cost-containment policy. Failure to adhere
to a cost-containment policy may be as simple as recommending a
treatment to a patient that is not covered by the patient’s benefits
122
package. The American Medical Association (“AMA”) has opined,
“Physicians can feel a real threat that their patient advocacy will be
123
punished by termination from the plan.”
Other contractual forms of control are less overt but still affect
patient care. For example, a physician cannot provide care if an
insurer denies coverage for the treatment the physician
124
recommends. Moreover, the utilization review physicians that
managed care organizations employ often have the authority to deny
or approve a treating physician’s recommendation with little or no
125
role for the treating physician’s input. These physicians have the
authority to deny or approve a treating physician’s recommendation
126
without ever seeing the patient in question. Thus, physicians
contracting with managed care organizations often feel a loss of
127
control over patient care.

20for%20download/HCAN%20-%20Health%20Insurance%20Company%20Abuses%20-%20
Final.pdf.
122. Jensen, supra note 117, at 153 (noting that managed care organizations use
termination-without-cause clauses to restrict the flow of information between physicians and
patients).
123. DIV. PHYSICIAN & PATIENT ADVOCACY, AMA ADVOCACY RES. CTR., PHYSICIAN
PRACTICE STRATEGIES: PROTESTING UTILIZATION/MEDICAL NECESSITY DECISIONS 5
(undated), http://getwell.org/Wihwod/Doc/physstrat.pdf.
124. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204–05 (2004) (noting a managed care
organization’s drug formulary constrains a physician unless a patient can afford to pay a drug’s
market price outside of a plan); Pappas v. Asbel (Pappas I), 724 A.2d 889, 890 (Pa. 1998)
(noting that the physician was forced to choose between delaying an emergency hospital
transfer until the HMO approved his hospital referral, or transferring the patient without
approval at his own expense); see also Luft, supra note 116, at 963 (noting that managed care
organization formularies constrict physicians in the drugs they prescribe).
125. AMA, MODEL MANAGED CARE CONTRACT 42 (4th ed. 2005).
126. See Bradford H. Gray, Trust and Trustworthy Care in the Managed Care Era, 16
HEALTH AFF. 34, 43 (1997) (noting that “utilization review organizations with high levels of
physician control were particularly willing to interfere with practicing physicians’ autonomy”
(footnote omitted)).
127. Luft, supra note 116, at 964 (attributing physicians’ negative reaction to managed care
to perceptions of loss of control); see also David S. Brody & Pamela Brody, Managed Care and
Physician Burnout, 5 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS, Sept. 2003, http://virtualmentor.amaassn.org/2003/09/ccas3-0309.html (noting that managed care organizations often dictate how
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Externally imposed control over treating physicians is
128
129
demeaning and can lead to “burnout,” which negatively affects
care in pervasive ways. Doctors Brody and Brody define burnout as
frustration from managed care policies that results in “emotional and
physical exhaustion, a sense of alienation, cynicism, negativism, and
detachment to the point that the physician begins to resent work and
130
the people who are associated with it.” They estimate that up to 40
percent of physicians experience burnout and exhibit a wide range of
symptoms, including anger and irritability; excessive complaining;
blaming annoyances on external factors; becoming introverted,
isolated, and withdrawn; overeating; abusing alcohol or drugs; or
131
experiencing chronic physical symptoms. These symptoms and the
underlying frustration that causes them negatively affect patients as
well as doctors. Patients of physicians experiencing burnout are less
132
likely to adhere to medications and follow-up appointments.
Finally, physician burnout may actually counteract the purpose of
cost-containment policies; physicians exhibiting these symptoms tend
to make more referrals and use more outpatient procedures than
133
physicians satisfied with their work arrangements.
Moreover, physicians themselves report that managed care
decreases the quality of care they are able to administer and
134
negatively affects their relationships with patients. Bottom-lineoriented cost-containment policies have considerable impact on
providers in their practice of medicine, and “conflict with the
135
physician’s duty of loyalty to the patient.” Furthermore, managed
care’s effect on physician decisionmaking is so pervasive that it also
affects treatment decisions for patients covered by traditional fee-for136
service policies. For example, one study comparing the care
many patients physicians must see per hour, thus controlling even the style of interaction
between the physician and patient).
128. See Luft, supra note 116, at 962–63 (arguing that a physician’s professional opinion is
diminished when managed care organizations require that a nurse or clerk provide preapproval
for medical decisions about treatment).
129. Brody & Brody, supra note 127.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Jensen, supra note 117, at 148.
136. Under a fee-for-service policy, an insurer reimburses a provider without reviewing the
appropriateness of the treatment prescribed.
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resulting from managed care as opposed to fee-for-service Medicare
beneficiaries found that increases in managed care’s overall market
share was associated with decreased health care costs for all patients,
137
regardless of insurer. In other words, by subjecting physicians to
utilization review oversight, managed care organizations change the
138
way physicians treat patients. Thus, although cost-containment
policies are necessary to curb the unsustainable growth in health care
spending, they must be carefully circumscribed to avoid negating the
benefit that well-trained physicians bring to health care.
B. Bearing Responsibility for All
Although managed care organizations exert authority over the
physician’s utilization patterns and exercise discretion in determining
which prescribed treatments to cover, the physician ultimately retains
all responsibility for the patient’s well being. When a patient suffering
from the consequences of denied coverage seeks a legal remedy, the
physician will inevitably be named as a defendant—with or without
the insurer. This disconnect between legal responsibility and actual
control illustrates the inherent problem with the different standards
of care governing treatment decisions made by practicing physicians
and insurers.
The unpredictable and unlikely chance that a beneficiary will
recover from an insurer for a wrongful denial of coverage creates
tremendous liability risk for the physician who prescribed the
treatment. Because ERISA limits beneficiaries’ recovery to the cost
of benefits denied, harmed patients often sue their treating physicians
in tort, even if the harm stemmed from the denial of the very care that
the physician had recommended. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s
narrow definition of treatment decisions contributes to the frequency
with which treating physicians are named as defendants in denial of
coverage actions. As discussed, only mixed decisions survive
preemption, and avoiding preemption often depends on a finding that
the treating physician played a role in the utilization review
139
decision. A plaintiff is therefore more likely to succeed with a state
law claim against an insurer when the claim directly implicates the

137. Laurence C. Baker, Association of Managed Care Market Share and Health
Expenditures for Fee-for-Service Medicare Patients, 281 JAMA 432, 435 (1999).
138. See id. at 436 (hypothesizing that physicians “adopt managed care practice patterns for
all their patients”).
139. See supra Part II.A.
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140

treating physician’s actions. In other words, patients may state a
negligence claim against their treating physicians, alleging that the
failure either to insist on or order a different diagnostic test or
specialty referral is the cause of the adverse outcome, rather than the
141
insurer’s coverage decision.
Thus, the ERISA scheme incentivizes wronged beneficiaries to
reshape their claim into one relating to the quality of care delivered
by the treating physician, rather than the quantity of benefits
142
denied. Case law is replete with examples. In one instance, a patient
had knee replacement surgery and then was denied coverage of the
post-surgical physical rehabilitation recommended by her orthopedic
143
surgeon. When her knee failed to recover, she filed a state law claim
against the insurer and its utilization review nurse for wrongful denial
144
of benefits. Although she had not sought action against her treating
physician, she amended her complaint to preserve her state law claim,
naming the physician as an additional defendant when the insurer
145
removed her case to federal court. Suing her treating physician
proved to be the only way to do this: the district court dismissed all of
the claims against the insurer and remanded the claims against the
146
surgeon to state court for litigation.
Furthermore, because of the tremendous expense involved in
litigating a preemption dispute, treating physicians are often the sole
defendant in an action stemming from harm resulting from the denial
147
of coverage. Thus, when an insurer denies coverage of care, the

140. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 252 (“ERISA is not a bar to suing as long as you
can avoid ‘pleading into the teeth of ERISA’ by taking the ‘square peg of a benefits denial case
and fitting it into the round hold of a direct liability theory.’” (quoting from the authors’
interviews with plaintiffs’ lawyers)).
141. David J. Lowe, Avoiding Liability for HMO Denials, PHYSICIANS NEWS DIG., Sept.
1997, available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/997lowe.html.
142. “‘[S]mart plaintiffs lawyers’ are learning how to plead their cases to ‘get around
ERISA,’ by framing almost any scenario as a quality-of-care issue rather than a coveredbenefits issue.” Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 252. Alleging that an insurer negligently denied
coverage without acting through a treating physician is considered a claim contesting the
quantity of benefits provided, and is thus subject to ERISA preemption. See supra Part II.A.
143. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1485 (7th Cir. 1996).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1485–86.
146. Id. at 1484 n.1, 1495 (noting that the district court’s remand of the claims against the
physician were not appealed, and affirming the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the
insurer).
147. See, e.g, Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 251 (noting that plaintiffs’ lawyers report that
it is far easier to name a physician than an insurer in a wrongful denial of coverage action).
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treating physician could potentially bear all liability. In a landmark
managed care preemption case, a patient sued the treating hospital
148
and physician after his insurer denied coverage of appropriate care.
The patient arrived at a community hospital emergency room with an
149
epidural abscess. Recognizing the severity of the patient’s condition,
the physician recommended immediate transfer to a larger hospital
150
with more specialized staff. The patient’s insurer, however, denied
approval for the transfer, and the consequent delay left the patient
151
paraplegic. Although the physician and admitting hospital brought
the insurer into the suit, both were forced into settlement after the
trial court granted summary judgment against them in their third152
party action.
Arguably, allowing treating physicians to be named in tort for
failing to successfully contest an insurer’s denial of coverage of care
appropriately incentivizes a physician to advocate for the patient. The
duty that attaches to the physician when the insurer denies coverage,
however, is not clearly defined. Consequently, patient care is
negatively affected by inefficient attempts to avoid unpredictable
liability risks. Without a shift in liability from the provider to the
managed care organization for the refusal to cover physicianrecommended care, physicians are burdened with a risk that is both
153
uninvited and unavoidable.

148. Pappas v. Asbel (Pappas II), 768 A.2d 1089, 1091 (Pa. 2001).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1092 n.2.
153. Compare Summers v. Touchpoint Health Plan, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 182, 186, 197 (Wis.
2008) (finding that denial of coverage of the experimental treatment was arbitrary and
actionable when the physician providing the second opinion recommended radiation and
chemotherapy because the patient’s health plan excluded coverage of clinical trials), with
Emerson v. Med. Mutual of Ohio, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 3512, 2004-Ohio-3892, ¶¶ 20–36 (Ct.
App. July 23, 2004) (dismissing all claims against an insurer because the patient’s coverage
excluded experimental treatments). These cases both involve allegations of wrongful denial of
coverage for experimental cancer treatment. The fact that the courts came out differently on
whether treatment was covered by the plans’ terms indicates that physicians cannot predict
when a coverage decision will result in liability, on the part of either the managed care
organization or the physician. Although neither patient accepted treatment from the physicians
recommending the covered treatment, it cannot be said that had they done so, the treatment
would not have been actionable. In Summers v. Touchpoint Health Plan, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 182
(Wis. 2008), the court noted several times that the external review board had concluded that the
experimental cancer treatment was, in fact, the standard of care applied to a child. E.g., id. at
185. Thus, had Summers accepted treatment from Dr. Maloney and filed suit when radiation
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Physicians are not only powerless to reverse denials of coverage
but also must take affirmative steps to minimize their own risk. They
must invest in both offensive measures to minimize the risk of being
sued and defensive measures if they nevertheless end up in court. At
a minimum, physicians must formally protest a plan’s denial of
coverage for medically necessary care, and should formally indicate to
their patients how they have done so. The AMA provides physicians
with form letters to indicate to a plan and to a patient the physician’s
disagreement with a plan’s denial of coverage or premature hospital
154
discharge.
Precautionary measures range from maintaining
documentation of every communication made between each patient
and each patient’s insurer, including a form signed by the patient
detailing his understanding of the denial of coverage, to investigating
managed care organizations before entering into a contractual
155
relationship as a covered provider. Attorneys instruct physicians to
familiarize themselves with circumstances under which a particular
insurer is likely to deny coverage. In addition, they counsel doctors to
understand the appeal process in advance, to join an insurer’s review
board, to develop relationships with managed care decisionmakers to
156
reduce the likelihood that coverage for their patients will be denied,
to file multiple appeals until reaching a different and more
sympathetic claims reviewer, and to submit a colleague’s report
157
supporting the recommendation for coverage. Moreover, some
attorneys even recommend that physicians refuse to further treat
patients who cannot pay out of pocket and are denied coverage for
158
the treatment the physician first recommends.
Physicians’ inability to minimize the tremendous liability risk
they bear for insurers’ cost-containment activities directly detracts
from patient care. When an insurer refuses to cover medically
159
160
necessary care, a physician bears an ethical and legal duty to
failed, the physician would have faced liability despite her belief that the patient’s coverage
excluded treatment involving clinical trials.
154. See DIV. PHYSICIAN & PATIENT ADVOCACY, supra note 123, at 3–4 (providing
physicians with form letters A–C for these purposes).
155. Lowe, supra note 141.
156. Id.
157. Hall, supra note 119, at 116.
158. Id.
159. The AMA imposes an ethical duty on physicians to “advocate for any care . . . [that]
will materially benefit their patients.” AMA, Code of Ethics Op. E 8.13 (1996).
160. This duty first amounted to a legal duty in Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct.
App. 1986).
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appeal the insurer’s decision. Physicians are often liable for their
failure to make such an appeal even when a claim against the
161
Although the
managed care organization is not preempted.
physician’s ethical duty to appeal a denial of coverage is unavoidable
(physicians are ultimately responsible for the patient’s care), the legal
duty is problematic for three reasons. First, physicians have neither
the time nor the legal expertise to interpret the terms of a patient’s
coverage to determine whether an appeal of a coverage decision is
either justified or worthwhile. A physician who does not understand
the terms of a plan could waste a great deal of time appealing
coverage decisions that are contractually justified. Second, physicians
may apply a different standard of care than a plan exercises in making
a medical necessity determination (because not all plans apply
community standard of care measures when making coverage
162
determinations), and thus cannot necessarily determine when a plan
has wrongly denied coverage. Third, physicians burdened by the
appeal process reallocate time from providing patient care to filing
appeals. When potential liability shifts from physicians to the
managed care organization, however, insurers are much more likely
to apply medical criteria in making coverage determinations, even if
163
not legally bound to do so.
Physicians face tremendous liability risk for the cost-containment
activities of managed care organizations—and yet they are effectively
powerless to minimize these activities. By holding managed care
organizations to a uniform standard of care in making coverage
decisions, physicians could prescribe necessary treatment, file quick
and timely appeals of any denial of coverage (if necessary), and move
on to treat the next patient, without being preoccupied by the risk of

161. See James River Corp. v. Bolton, 14 So.3d 868, 875 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (“[I]t would
be incumbent upon the doctors treating [the plaintiff], as providers, to appeal the denial of
medical treatment.”).
162. Compare Summers v. Touchpoint Health Plan, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 182, 200 n.20 (Wis.
2008) (Roggensack, J., dissenting) (arguing that the standard of care to which the physician is
bound is irrelevant to the determination that a policy does or does not cover treatment, and that
the majority violated the “primary rule of ERISA-governed plans” in reasoning otherwise), with
Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 857 (Ct. App. 1989) (“[A] standard of
medical necessity significantly at variance with the medical standards of the
community . . . . frustrat[es] the justified expectations of the insured, [and] is inconsistent with
the liberal construction of policy language required by the duty of good faith.”).
163. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 265 (“[T]he need to defend coverage decisions in
court has caused health plans to rely more on objective medical criteria that can be documented
in the medical literature, rather than on the subjective opinion of medical directors.”).
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liability and without fear that the patient is forgoing necessary care.
Furthermore, upon a denial of coverage, a physician could
recommend and provide an alternate treatment rather than turn the
patient away in fear of liability.
Several courts have explicitly pointed to the discrepancy between
a physician’s actual authority and legal responsibility. For example,
the Southern District of New York noted that a plan administrator—
after prospectively denying coverage of the prescribed treatment—
instructed the beneficiary’s physician that, “Regardless of our
decision you and the patient have the responsibility for determining
164
the appropriateness of treatment.” The Fifth Circuit referred to
165
similar language appearing in a plan’s written policy. Requiring
precertification for certain procedures, the policy provided that
“When reading this booklet, remember that all decisions regarding
166
your medical care are up to you and your doctor.” Immediately
below this clause, the policy sets forth the monetary penalties that
167
attach for failure to follow the plan’s precertification decision.
Thus, because managed care organizations exert tremendous
authority over the care provided by physicians but escape tort liability
in doing so, they assume the ability to control treatment without any
of the corresponding responsibility.
IV. STRUCTURING A STANDARD OF CARE TO INCENTIVIZE
REASONABLE CARE WITHOUT DETERRING
COST-CONTAINMENT ACTIVITIES
The conflicting standards of care that govern the treatment
decisions of practicing physicians and insurers are antithetical both to
a sense of justice and to the goal of managed care—providing lowcost and high-quality health care. Several commentators and
professional organizations have proposed remedial schemes to
address ERISA preemption. But none have resulted in change, nor
have they addressed the problem as one of irreconcilable liability
regimes. This Part does not purport to offer a comprehensive
solution, but rather suggests that a first step in reforming managed
164. Rubin-Schneiderman v. Merit Behavioral Care Corp., No. 00 Civ.8101 JSM, 2003 WL
22019833, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2003) (quoting a letter from the doctor who had performed
the utilization review).
165. Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1323 (5th Cir. 1992).
166. Id. (emphasis omitted).
167. Id.
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care liability is to align the legal standards that govern treatment
decisions in all phases of care. Section A provides a review of the
problems that emerge from the application of two different standards
of care to decisions that lead to the same result—the provision or
denial of medical care. Section B then reviews three attempts to
address these problems, none of which has proven successful. Finally,
Section C argues that only by aligning these legal standards can
effective reform be initiated.
A. To Treat or Not to Treat: One Decision, Two Standards of Care
The different standards that govern insurers’ coverage decisions
and practicing physicians’ treatments are antithetical both to a basic
theory of the law and to the goal of delivering high-quality care at a
sustainable cost.
1. Confusing Causation and Eliminating Deterrence. Allowing
insurers to escape tort liability for wrongful denial of coverage defeats
two basic principles of civil liability—that a plaintiff may seek
recovery from the party that caused the harm, and that the remedy
may deter future wrongs.
First, the gap between the tort and contract theories of liability
that are applied to physicians and insurers creates an inconsistency in
the legal theories plaintiffs can plead in court. Because harmed
168
patients can seek greater remedies in tort than in contract, they are
169
more likely to sue their physicians for wrongful denials of coverage.
The very fact that the law allows a wronged beneficiary to name a
treating physician as a defendant is inconsistent with the basic
causation principles in tort—the treating physician simply did not
170
cause the patient’s harm.
Second, and more importantly, applying contract law to
utilization review decisions fails to deter negligent coverage denials.
171
Unbound by the professional ethics governing physicians, insurers

168. Payton v. Aetna/US Healthcare, No. 100440/99, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 91, at *7 (Sup.
Ct. Mar. 22, 2000) (“[A] recovery in tort may well be greater than a recovery based merely on
the contract claim, which may be limited to recovery of the premiums paid . . . .”).
169. See supra Part II.C.
170. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986) (finding that a costcontainment policy is the proximate cause of the injury if it affects physician judgment).
171. See Gray, supra note 126, at 40 (“[E]thical standards are not well established in the
managed care industry and devote little or no attention to the problems addressed by the
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administering utilization review procedures need explicit incentive to
act in the best interest of the patient. Inappropriate denials of
coverage are extremely common. In 2007, for example, Blue Cross
Blue Shield Association (“BCBS”) and twenty-three of its affiliates
agreed to settle allegations of conspiracy to reject or delay claims for
172
medically necessary covered services, among other things. BCBS
173
will pay out over 131 million dollars and will adopt new contract
provisions, including the AMA’s recommended definition of “medical
174
necessity.”
In contrast, tort liability would deter managed care organizations
175
from negligently denying coverage of care. Threatened with liability
for compensatory and punitive damages, rather than merely the cost
of benefits denied, insurers tempted to increase profits through
aggressive utilization review would first consider the steep cost of a
176
judgment in tort.
2. Undermining Cost-Containment.
The law’s disparate
treatment of insurers and treating physicians is not only antithetical to
a basic sense of justice but also to the practical and highly relevant
goals of delivering quality care at a reasonable cost.
Managed care organizations contain costs by reducing utilization
177
of health care services. They successfully reduce utilization by

fiduciary ethic, particularly the conflict-of-interest problem and its resolution in favor of the
patient.”).
172. See Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint at 65–68, Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Ass’n, No. 03-21296 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2003) (alleging conspiracy, among other things); Order
Approving Settlement Among Certain Blue Parties and Physicians, Physician Groups, and
Physician Organizations, Certifying Class, and Directing Entry of Final Judgment, Love v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, No. 03-21296 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2008) (approving settlement of class
action complaints).
173. Order Approving Settlement Among Certain Blue Parties and Physicians, Physician
Groups, and Physician Organizations, Certifying Class, and Directing Entry of Final Judgment,
supra note 172, at 5.
174. PRACTICE MGMT. CTR., AMA, HOW THE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT HELPS THE PHYSICIAN PRACTICE (2008), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/
upload/mm/368/bcbsflyer.pdf. Health Care for America NOW provides multiple examples of
egregious denials of coverage. See HEALTH CARE FOR AM. NOW, supra note 121, at 7 (pointing
to eight instances of penalties imposed by state departments of insurance and four examples of
state attorney general investigations, all for wrongful denials of coverage).
175. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 266 (“Liability . . . affects how health plans
exercise the discretionary authority they may have to deviate from contractual coverage
limitations.”).
176. Noble & Brennan, supra note 37, at 300.
177. Baker, supra note 137, at 435.
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carefully drafting contractual provisions that theoretically eliminate
178
repetitive, unnecessary, or ineffective care. The ERISA preemption
scheme, however, incentivizes states to require insurers to provide
more than a plan’s terms, which ultimately defeats the costcontainment purpose of managing health care. For example, in Aetna
179
Health Inc. v. Davila, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that
ERISA preempts recovery under a Texas law requiring health plans
to exercise ordinary care in the administration of benefits because
“[t]he duties imposed by the [state law] . . . do not arise independently
180
of ERISA or the plan terms.” In other words, the state law could
survive preemption only by imposing liability for failure to provide
coverage for treatment that was not covered by the terms of the
181
plan. Thus, for a state law to govern coverage decisions made by
employer-sponsored health plans, liability must attach for denial of
extracontractual benefits. Such legislation, however, would be
antithetical to the cost-containment efforts of the managed care
movement.
Protecting insurers from tort actions for their wrongful denials of
coverage is also deleterious to the quality of managed care. Imposing
liability for negligent coverage determinations incentivizes reasonable
182
care in making these determinations and would help reduce tension
between the physicians providing care and the insurers challenging
183
their treatment decisions. Physicians may always share a “collective
184
nostalgia for a simple world of doctors know best,” but they will be
far more amenable to industry reform that strongly discourages cost
containment that is detrimental to patient care. Imposing a standard
185
of care on insurers would “lead to system-wide improvements” in

178. See, e.g., Danzon & Pauly, supra note 20, at 593 (describing the ability of the managed
care contract to reduce both moral hazard as well as physician initiated unnecessary care).
179. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
180. Id. at 212–13.
181. Id.
182. For a discussion of the deterrent value of managed-care liability for negligent coverage
denials, see Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 34, at 1968–77.
183. This suggestion assumes that physicians’ strong resistance to managed care’s
assumption of the utilization review function is attributable to the lack of liability attaching to
an insurer’s denial of coverage that is harmful to patient health. This tension could ease as
liability is reallocated. Not all commentators accept this explanation for physician hostility
toward managed care. For an excellent argument that physicians reject third-party payer costcontainment efforts for professional reasons, see Richman, supra note 24, at 1736–37.
184. Id. at 1736 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 270.
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overall cost-containment efforts, incentivizing managed care
organizations to utilize clinically based standards in making coverage
186
determinations. This would result in better patient care at a lower
cost—reflecting the systems-approach to quality improvement
187
promulgated by the Institute of Medicine almost a decade ago.
B. Patchwork Proposals
The problems created by ERISA preemption of challenges to
denied health care benefits are extensive and entrenched in the legal
landscape governing insurers. Both academics and professional
associations have proposed potential remedies to the problem, which
this Section groups into three categories. These proposals have fallen
on deaf ears in Congress. The strengths—and weaknesses—of these
proposals are instructive to the effort to align the standards of care
governing treatment decisions of insurers and practicing physicians.
1. Imposing Ethical Standards on Managed Care Organizations.
First, several attempts have been made to impose ethical standards on
managed care organizations. This is directly related to aligning the
standards of care governing treating physicians and the utilization
review boards that scrutinize their recommendations. For example,
the American Association of Health Plans promulgated a
“Philosophy of Care” mission statement, providing that “patients
188
should have the right care, at the right time, in the right setting.”
Ethical standards are also imposed on insurers: the National
Committee for Quality Assurance (“NCQA”) created the
“Accreditation Standards for Managed Care,” requiring insurers
seeking accreditation to adopt a statement of beneficiaries’ rights and
responsibilities that includes access to information, available
189
grievance procedures, and confidentiality standards. The NCQA
could go even further, requiring insurers—like hospitals—to construct
186. Id. (“Managed care organizations might be encouraged to select skilled and careful
clinical decisionmakers, supply them with proper information and tools, assign them to areas
within their expertise, and monitor their performance.”).
187. Using liability to incentivize managed care organizations to implement systems
designed to reduce error would lead to far greater quality improvement in patient care than can
be attained through individual physician malpractice liability. See Noble & Brennan, supra note
37, at 297 (“[B]y holding the ‘enterprise’ accountable through liability, courts may create an
impetus for MCOs to implement systems with patient safety in mind.”).
188. Gray, supra note 126, at 40.
189. Id. at 39–40 (suggesting that the NCQA make accreditation contingent on the adoption
of additional fiduciary language).
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financial incentives in such a way that “protects the integrity of
190
clinical decisionmaking.” The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (“CMS”) already imposes a similar standard on the health
plans with which it contracts, prohibiting any physician contract from
attaching a financial incentive to the reduction or limitation of
191
medically necessary care.
Although these pledges encourage health plans to at least
superficially operate on ethical grounds, they do not impose any real
requirements on insurers—and importantly, they do not require the
insurer to adhere to the “best interest of the patient,” as treating
192
physicians are required to do. Notably, the law that does impose a
legally binding fiduciary duty on insurers—ERISA—does not allow a
meaningful remedy to attach when this duty is breached, and has
proved to be minimally effective in incentivizing ethical
193
administration of benefits.
2. Uniform Standards of Care. A second proposal to remedy the
legal vacuum that governs coverage decisions is to impose a uniform
standard of care on the processes that managed care organizations
194
follow in making coverage determinations. This approach purposely
circumvents plaintiffs’ attempts to apply state tort law to managed
care organizations, and instead creates a unique standard to account
for insurers’ function in containing costs and allocating resources.

190. The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations imposes this
accreditation requirement on hospitals. Scott, supra note 48, at 288.
191. See id. at 288 n.135 (noting that the Civil Monetary Penalties Law requires that insurers
providing benefits to Medicaid or Medicare beneficiaries may only operate physician incentive
plans relating to those patients if “[n]o specific payment is made directly or indirectly under the
plan to a physician or physician group as an inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary
services” (alteration in original) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 (1998))). Notably, ERISA does
not preclude insurers from attaching financial incentives to physician utilization of care, but
rather requires full disclosure of any such arrangement. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629
(8th Cir. 1997) (“When an HMO’s financial incentives discourage a treating doctor from
providing essential health care referrals for conditions covered under the plan benefit structure,
the incentives must be disclosed and the failure to do so is a breach of ERISA’s fiduciary
duties.”).
192. Gray, supra note 126, at 39–40.
193. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 232 (2000).
194. See, e.g., Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 288–89 (suggesting that “the development of
a procedural standard of care as a means to assess the conduct of a managed care organization
implementing a cost-quality tradeoff through a clinically based coverage determination”).
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Dean Agrawal and Professor Hall have set forth a “reasonable”
process standard that would exclusively and directly govern
195
utilization review procedures. Under this standard:
A managed care organization would be liable for its share of a
patient’s injury caused by an incorrect coverage denial only if the
plaintiff proved that the applicable cost containment procedure was
(a) not designed to acquire and consider relevant clinical factors or
to base coverage determinations on one or more sources of
externally developed, scientifically valid, current medical
information, or (b) the cost containment procedure otherwise
meeting (a) was not implemented substantially according to its own
terms, and (c) the coverage determination was the proximate cause
196
of plaintiff’s harm.

Others have proposed additional process standards that might
directly apply to the utilization review process. For example, the
AMA has asserted that the law should require a licensed physician,
specialized in the relevant area of medicine, to make a final denial of
197
coverage.
A process approach is advantageous because it avoids the pitfalls
of tort law. Dean Agrawal and Professor Hall caution against
applying the professional medical standard to utilization review
198
processes for several reasons. First, traditional medical malpractice
standards of care are generally simplistic and ambiguous—requiring,
199
for example, that a physician apply “ordinary care.” A processbased standard designed explicitly for utilization review, on the other
200
hand, could provide explicit guidelines for avoiding liability.
Second, a medical standard of care would subject a managed care
organization to “[e]xcessive second-guessing of the substance of
coverage decisions [which] could over-deter insurers’ socially

195. Id. at 292.
196. Id. (footnote omitted).
197. See DIV. PHYSICIAN & PATIENT ADVOCACY, supra note 123, at 5 (“[S]tate law may
also require that final adverse determinations be issued by a licensed physician that specializes
in the area relevant to the requested service or treatment.”).
198. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 285.
199. Id. at 297–98.
200. See id. at 298 (“A process standard would hold managed care organizations liable for
consequential personal injury if, in determining health insurance coverage based on medical
criteria, they use a procedure that is not designed to acquire and consider relevant clinical
factors, or if they depart materially from normal procedures without adequate justification.”).
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201

beneficial efforts to contain costs.” Thus, a process-based standard
imposes liability for wrongful or negligent coverage denials, but
affords managed care organizations “reasonable leeway to respond in
good faith to unusual situations by deviating from normal procedures
when . . . appropriate,” so long as the elements of the standard are
202
met.
3. Enhancing Patient Rights. Finally, a third type of remedy to
minimize the wrongful denial of coverage empowers patients to
advocate for themselves. First, insurers can be required to implement
and adhere to better appeal processes so that patients may effectively
contest coverage decisions. Second, insurers can be required to use
unambiguous language in enrollment applications so that potential
beneficiaries can select the plan that best approximates their
anticipated health care needs.
Insurers managing ERISA health plans are already subject to
relatively stringent appeal processes requirements, which helps
ensure that negligent coverage denials are at least reviewed in a
203
timely manner, if not reversed. Furthermore, most states require
that health plans allow beneficiaries to challenge a coverage denial in
204
an external review process. Because the Supreme Court has ruled
that ERISA does not preempt state laws governing review processes,
all health plans operating in these states are subject to external review
205
requirements.
The AMA’s Model Managed Care Contract
advocates that health plans themselves should provide that coverage
206
denials will be eligible for due process review by independent peers.
Requiring insurers to use plain language terms in their policies
would allow applicants to enroll in the plan that is most likely to

201. Id. at 298; see also id. at 287, 295 (noting that a managed care organization should not
be held liable for honest differences of opinion when it chooses the less protective of two or
more professionally justifiable courses of action, because in this situation the managed care
organization is making a resource decision rather than a treatment decision).
202. Id. at 293–94.
203. The Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration promulgated
these rules. For a description of the requirements placed upon insurers to ensure a timely appeal
process, see AMA, supra note 125, at 43–44.
204. Id. at 44.
205. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 355 (2002).
206. See AMA, supra note 125, at 44 (“Section 5.2 of the AMA Model Managed Care
Contract requires that adverse decisions relating to medical necessity or coverage are subject to
a due process review that is ultimately decided by independent peers, rather than by the MCO
in its sole discretion.”).
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cover potential health care costs. More importantly—because it is
impossible for beneficiaries to predict future treatment needs—clear
contractual language would deter plans from arbitrarily denying
coverage.
C. Starting with the Basics: Aligning Liability
Health care reform that focuses on expanding coverage and
reducing costs will have deleterious effects on quality of care unless it
is coupled with managed care liability reform. Recovery in tort is
more meaningful to wronged beneficiaries than is recovery in
208
contract, and—absent preemption—insurers can be subject to tort
209
despite their contractual relationship with beneficiaries.
The
problem, then, is that ERISA’s extensive preemption regime
obstructs the majority of these legal actions. The above proposals
provide piecemeal approaches to imposing responsibility for coverage
decisions, but they have not resulted in any legal change. The
ultimate solution will require Congress to address a fundamental
discrepancy in health law: physicians and insurers both face legal risk
that is inversely related to the control they yield over the ultimate
course of treatment administered to each patient.
This Section argues that aligning the standards of care such that
the same standards apply to all treatment decisions—those made by
practicing and reviewing physicians—should be the foundation for
much-needed legal reform. This Section must begin with an important
caveat: aligning the standards of care governing those who make
treatment decisions does not require expanding tort liability. Indeed,
medical malpractice actions have unnecessarily complicated the

207. Several bills currently under consideration promulgate such an approach. For example,
both the Senate HELP Committee Affordable Health Choices Act and the Senate Finance
Committee America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009 would create a minimum “essential health
care benefits package” and require all health plans to offer the package. HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., supra note 12, at 19 (comparing the various congressional health reform
measures on a continually updated basis).
208. Payton v. Aetna/US Healthcare, No. 100440/99, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 91, at *7 (Sup.
Ct. Mar. 22, 2000) (“[A] recovery in tort may well be greater than a recovery based merely on
the contract claim, which may be limited to recovery of the premiums paid . . . .”).
209. Id. (“‘A legal duty independent of contractual obligations may be imposed by law as an
incident to the parties’ relationship. Certain professionals . . . may be found subject to tort
liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, irrespective of their contractual duties. . . . In
these instances, it is policy, not the parties’ contract, that gives rise to a duty of [] care.”
(alterations in original) (quoting Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 (N.Y.
1992))).
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practice of medicine, and medical experts have heralded tort reform
210
for over three decades. Given the failure of the tort reform
movement to accomplish substantive change, however, and the
211
stagnancy of the movement toward enterprise liability, this Section
assumes that Congress is more likely to subject insurers to tort than
physicians to contract. Holding physicians liable in tort does not
212
improve quality of care, but a call for tort reform is far beyond the
scope of this Note. This Note’s discussion of tort liability is limited to
the discrepancy in liability risk that treating and utilization review
physicians face. This inconsistency has created problems that are too
substantial to set aside in the hopes that tort reform will transpire.
Thus, this Section asserts that utilization review physicians must be
subject to the same standards of care as treating physicians, but does
not purport to tout tort as a model—or even adequate—remedy for
adverse medical outcomes.
Despite the problems that tort liability presents, many of its
standards can be easily applied to insurers to incentivize reasonable
utilization review processes without deterring cost containment. The
AMA’s Model Managed Care Contract promulgates a definition of
medical necessity for utilization review that would align with the
definition to which physicians are held in making treatment
213
recommendations. Attaching actual liability to this standard could

210. See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance and Damage Caps:
Getting Beyond Band Aids to Substantive Systems Treatment to Improve Quality and Safety in
Healthcare, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 504 (2004) (“Tort reform [began in the late 1970s and]
continued in the 1980’s and the 1990’s . . . .”); Bill Bradley, Editorial, Tax Reform’s Lesson for
Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, § 4 (Week in Review), at 9 (noting that medical
malpractice reform has been a constant in congressional debates since the early 1980s).
211. See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 34, at 1933 (“[Enterprise] liability is essential to the
provision of optimal medical care . . . .”).
212. See, e.g., COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 109–11 (Linda T. Krohn, et al. eds., 2000)
(arguing that the medical malpractice liability regime discourages reporting of error and thus
inhibits quality control efforts); James Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It
Doing in Assuring Quality, Accounting for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality in the
Health Care Marketplace?, 11 ANN. HEALTH L. 125 (2002) (noting that improving quality of
care requires a systems approach to medicine which is incompatible with the tort-based
malpractice system).
213. Under the AMA’s model contract, an insurer would have to approve coverage for:
“Health care services or procedures that a prudent physician would provide to a patient for the
purpose of preventing, diagnosing, or treating an illness, injury, disease or its symptoms in a
manner that is (a) in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice; (b)
clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and duration; and (c) not
primarily for the economic benefit of the health plans and purchasers or for the convenience of
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incentivize the exercise of reasonable caution in denying coverage,
as well as the administration of an expedient and responsive internal
215
appeal process to address denials of coverage. These benefits are
realized even when actual litigation remains minimal, suggesting that
the threat of liability need not significantly increase costs for
216
insurers.
Tort liability may deter negligent coverage denials, but it must be
strictly limited. Imposing unlimited liability, or creating liability risk
even when coverage is properly denied, could deter managed care
217
entities from implementing any cost-containment policies at all.
Thus, the application of tort to managed care entities must be limited
in three critical ways. First, liability cannot attach when coverage is
unambiguously excluded under the terms of the policy. Second, costeffectiveness research must be admissible as evidence that a contested
coverage decision was reasonable under a cost-containment policy.
Third, damages for the wrongful denial of coverage must be capped.
First, liability cannot attach when a policy’s terms unambiguously
exclude coverage. Dean Agrawal and Professor Hall have argued
extensively for managed care liability reform, but caution that
“failure to grant [contractual] exceptions should not be the basis for
personal injury liability. Tort suits should not become vehicles for
218
rewriting coverage documents that are clear and precise.” The
concern that a minimum standard of liability would lead to coverage
the patient, treating physician, or other health care provider.” AMA, supra note 125, at 42. The
AMA has repeatedly filed amicus briefs in ERISA preemption litigation arguing that questions
of coverage for medically necessary care must be left to regulation by state malpractice law.
E.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 203 (2004); Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller,
538 U.S. 329, 331 (2003); Cicio v. Does, 385 F.3d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
214. Interviews with health plan managers and attorneys suggest that the threat of tort
liability effectively deters negligent denials of coverage. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at
264–65 (noting that plan managers and attorneys report that although the current threat of
liability is not a major “driver of behavior or change,” it is “‘on the back of their minds’ when
making coverage decisions” and can cause them “to exercise ‘a lot more caution’ in denying
coverage,” including consulting “outside expert[s] to back up” coverage determinations).
215. Patient advocates note that plans have become “more attentive to coverage disputes”
since states began passing right-to-sue laws, even though ERISA preempts the application of
these laws to employer-sponsored plans. Id. at 264–65.
216. For example, plan managers and attorneys note that state right-to-sue laws have
affected their practices but have not actually significantly increased litigation. Id. at 266.
217. For an argument that any application of tort to insurers would deter cost-containment,
see generally Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 491 (1997). This Section proposes that appropriate limitations on liability would
address the concerns that Danzon raises.
218. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 279.
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approval of extracontractual treatment—out of fear of liability —is
unfounded. When a treatment is unambiguously excluded from
220
coverage, a health plan will not face liability for denying coverage,
nor would a managed care organization face liability for terminating
221
coverage upon expiration of a contract. Even when contractual
protections do not apply—that is, when a coverage denial is based on
222
a finding that care is not medically necessary —the threat of liability
will not pressure managed care organizations to approve all requests.
The sheer size of managed care organizations allows for prediction
and spreading of risk that allows for fewer defensive mechanisms than
223
physicians utilize.
A second critical limitation on managed-care liability is that costeffectiveness research must be admissible in court to defend costcontainment policies when challenged. Cost-effectiveness research
allows insurers (or any entity trying to achieve cost containment) to
measure the degree to which a new treatment provides either added
224
benefit or lower cost. For example, in France, no treatment or drug
225
is covered unless it serves one of these purposes. Managed care

219. See id. at 266 (“[D]ue to liability concerns, health plans are more willing to settle
coverage disputes ‘extra-contractually,’ that is, agree to pay for something they believe is not
covered by the insurance policy, especially where the patient has already incurred the cost at his
physician’s recommendation.”).
220. See Emerson v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 3512, 2004-Ohio-3892, at
¶ 23 (Ct. App. July 23, 2004) (“[The] treatment was experimental/investigative as defined in the
clear and unambiguous terms of the HMO Health Ohio policy, and, therefore, it was not
covered.”).
221. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 283 (noting that when a contract expires, the physician
or hospital may be liable for failing to continue to provide care according to the applicable
standard to which they are bound, whereas the managed care organization would not face
liability); see also Muse v. Charter Hosp. of Winston-Salem, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 589, 595 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding a hospital liable for discharging a suicidal patient upon expiration of his
insurance when it was contrary to his physician’s opinion).
222. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 279 (noting that liability may attach for coverage
determinations that hinge on judgments of whether a treatment is “medically necessary, nonexperimental, non-custodial [or] non-cosmetic”).
223. Id. at 270–71 (arguing that because of this ability to predict and spread risk, managedcare liability would likely not result in the defensive approval of claims in the way that physician
liability results in the defensive practice of medicine).
224. LISA ROCHAIX & BERTRAND XERRI, COMMONWEALTH FUND, NATIONAL
AUTHORITY FOR HEALTH: FRANCE 4–5 (2009), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/
Publications/Issue-Briefs/2009/Jul/National-Authority-for-Health-France.aspx.
225. Id. at 1. The same is true in many high-income nations. See, e.g., David A. Henry,
Suzanne R. Hill & Anthony Harris, Drug Prices and Value for Money: The Australian
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, 294 JAMA 2630, 2630–32 (2005) (describing the efficacy and
comparative cost-effectiveness analyses applied in the United Kingdom and Australia).
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organizations could use cost-effectiveness research to design and
implement far more effective cost-containment policies without
jeopardizing the health of beneficiaries. Managed care organizations
rarely use this type of research, however, possibly because its validity
226
in courts is widely unknown. Because courts have not traditionally
227
dealt with cost-effectiveness research, legislation creating a uniform
standard of care would have to expressly provide for the admissibility
of this evidence.
Finally, managed-care liability for actions against coverage
228
determinations must be subject to federally imposed damage caps.
Absence of caps in states with right-to-sue laws has resulted in very
large (albeit few) punitive awards against managed care
229
organizations. Although managed care organizations are extremely
profitable businesses, verdicts that would sink profits would deter
health plan administrators from exercising any cost-containment
230
policies whatsoever.
With these limitations in place, subjecting managed care
organizations to the same tort liability as physicians would not deter
beneficial cost-containment activity. Imposing liability for the
negligent denial of coverage imposes a financial burden on managed
care organizations only when care is wrongfully withheld. Thus,
managed care organizations that effectively administer costcontainment policies will experience minimal threat of liability; the
only plans that would experience financial threat are those that
wrongfully withhold coverage. In other words, this liability scheme
would only hurt those plans that do not benefit the health care
market. Therefore, contrary to the allegation that managed care
226. Clark C. Havighurst et al., Evidence: Its Meanings in Health Care and in Law, 26 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 195, 206 (2001).
227. See id. at 198 (discussing the “little health care litigation that explicitly involve[s] the
application of [cost-effectiveness analysis]”).
228. Damage caps may be particularly necessary in the managed care arena because of
society’s negative view of managed care organizations, which is apparent even in judicial
opinions. See, e.g., Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 238 n.12 (“Not even the judiciary is immune
from negative views of managed care organizations. . . . ‘[Defendant insurer] behaved like the
stereotypical HMO, with a beady eye on the bottom line and stony indifference to patient
welfare.’” (quoting Wagner v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 (N.D. Ill.
2000))).
229. See id. at 240 n.16 (noting that verdicts against managed care organizations ranged from
51 to 120 million dollars).
230. See id. at 271 (“The managed care industry . . . cannot serve the resource allocation
mission assigned to it by society . . . if ERISA preemption were lifted entirely and massive
punitive awards became commonplace.”).
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231

liability would increase consumer costs, liability would drive up
premiums only for those plans facing greater risk because of negligent
232
administration of cost-containment policies. A minimal standard of
care would thus improve competition in the coverage market without
233
increasing consumer costs.
Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that a minimum
standard of care for coverage decisions would expose managed care
organizations to tremendous amounts of litigation. In fact, states with
right-to-sue laws have not experienced marked increases in the
234
number of suits filed against managed care organizations. This may
be due in part to plaintiffs’ fear of facing an ERISA preemption
235
challenge, but the absence of an abundance of suits against
nonemployer-sponsored plans suggests that this fear is not the only
factor keeping plaintiffs out of the courts. Furthermore, it is not
litigation itself, but rather the threat of liability, that serves as a
236
deterrent to negligent denials of coverage.
CONCLUSION
As health care costs become prohibitive, managed care
organizations must increasingly perform the utilization review role
traditionally reserved for treating physicians. Shifting this task from
physician to insurer allows for effective cost containment, but subjects

231. See Noble & Brennan, supra note 37, at 298 (“Likely adaptations [to increased liability]
include an increase in premiums or a curtailment in benefits to cover the projected costs of
litigation.”).
232. Furthermore, courts have explicitly rejected the argument that the danger of increasing
consumer costs is a defense to liability. See Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719
N.E.2d 756, 764 (Ill. 1999) (“We disagree with [the defendant-HMO] that the cost-containment
role of HMOs entitles them to special consideration. The principle that organizations are
accountable for their tortious actions . . . is fundamental to our justice system. There is no
exception to this principle for HMOs.”).
233. See Noble & Brennan, supra note 37, at 300 (noting that most managed care
organizations, if acting as “rational economic players,” would avoid significant increases in
premiums, “either by modifying their managed care techniques to promote quality or by
eliminating them”).
234. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 275 (“To date, however, there is no evidence of
the much ballyhooed ‘flood of litigation’ that was predicted . . . .”).
235. See id. at 277 (“Uncertainty about ERISA is [one] reason for the absence of state
litigation under the right-to-sue laws.”).
236. See, e.g., id. at 266 (noting that a health care plan “reviewed and improved its processes
when a managed care liability statute was first enacted in the state because it originally thought
the statute would produce a lot of litigation. The changes remain in place, even though little
litigation has ensued.” (emphasis added)).
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the delivery of care to a second layer of decisionmaking that impacts
patient outcomes in the same manner as conventional medicine. The
discrepancy in liability that attaches to treating and utilization review
physicians has created two incompatible legal standards for the
delivery of care.
Extensive federal preemption has created a shield of legal
protection for employer-sponsored health plans. Potentially liable
only for the cost of benefits denied, insurers avoid tremendous legal
risk that would attach under state law—and that does attach to
affiliated treating physicians. Moreover, these insurers—in efforts to
achieve cost containment—exert considerable control over
physicians. Thus, the incongruity between provider and managed-care
liability has created a system of health care delivery in which only the
treating physician is subject to externally imposed restraint and legal
risk.
Managed-care liability reform is critical not only to providing
wronged beneficiaries with adequate remedies and to incentivizing
reasonable care in coverage denials, but also to alleviating physicians
of the legal responsibility arising from insurer conduct. Legislators
could spur this reform simply by aligning the standards governing the
two parties that bear tremendous control over the delivery of care.

